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INTRODUCTION
More than ten years ago in Cameroon, Elizabeth became a widow.1
Elizabeth’s in-laws accused her of killing her husband for his property, and took away everything she owned.2 Her in-laws shaved her
head with a broken bottle, although scissors are customary.3 She was
not allowed to see her children, bathe, or wear clothes for two
months.4 Her husband’s family forced her to sleep on the ground.5
After two months, she escaped with her children to her sister’s home.6
A month later, her in-laws found her and demanded that she either
pay the bride price or marry her husband’s older brother, who already
had two wives.7 When she told them that she would not marry her
husband’s brother and that she could not pay the bride price, her inlaws beat her.8 The in-laws threatened that if she did not comply with
their demands within one month, they would kill her and take her
children.9 Fortunately, Elizabeth and her children were able to leave
Cameroon and come to the United States.10

1. See Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008).
2. See id. at 1030–32; T.S. Twibell, The Development of Gender as a Basis for

Asylum in United States Immigration Law and Under the United Nations Refugee
Convention: Case Studies of Female Asylum Seekers From Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq
and Somalia, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 189, 213 (2010) (providing a more detailed version
of the facts of Elizabeth Ngengwe’s case than is presented in the Eighth Circuit case).
3. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1031; Twibell, supra note 2, at 214.
4. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1031; Twibell, supra note 2, at 214.
5. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1031.
6. See id. at 1032.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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More than eight years after requesting asylum, Elizabeth was
granted asylum in the United States.11 To be eligible for asylum, an
asylum seeker must establish that she experienced persecution or fear
of persecution on account of one of five enumerated grounds, including membership in a “particular social group” (“PSG”).12 When Elizabeth’s case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, the court held that Cameroonian widows constitute a
PSG, and that the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in holding otherwise in her earlier asylum proceedings.13 One year after the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the
BIA found Elizabeth eligible for asylum.14 After more than eight
years, Elizabeth found refuge in the United States.15
Elizabeth’s case highlights how the confusion about which groups
constitute PSGs can seriously delay meritorious asylum applications.16
Here, the immigration courts’ erroneous rulings invalidating Elizabeth’s PSG of female Cameroonian widows stood as a barrier to her
asylum claim.17 Just before Elizabeth was granted asylum, the attorney who represented her explained that “Elizabeth’s case is approaching almost nine years in the asylum process, and one of the
highest courts of the United States has found serious errors with the
decision of both the Immigration Judge and the BIA.”18 Based on the
duration of Elizabeth’s case, the attorney concluded that “[t]he oppression that Elizabeth has experienced in Cameroon has continued
in the U.S. through the asylum process.”19
Thousands of refugees like Elizabeth seek asylum in the United
States every year.20 In 2010, the United States received more than
11. See id. (noting that Elizabeth submitted her asylum application in 2001).
12. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 1101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)
(West 2006).
13. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1034.
14. See Elizabeth Ngengwe, WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS USA,
http://www.humanrightsusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=203
&Itemid=158 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (noting that after Human Rights USA filed
an amicus brief, the BIA found Elizabeth Ngengwe eligible for asylum in December
2009).
15. See id.
16. See Ngengwe, 534 F.3d at 1034.
17. See id.
18. Twibell, supra note 2, at 229.
19. Id.
20. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECH., FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1 (2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf (noting that the United States received 32,961
asylum applications in 2010 and granted asylum to 9,869 cases).
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32,000 asylum applications,21 the second-highest number of applications in the world.22 The large number of refugees that seek asylum
in the United States every year indicates the importance of U.S. asylum law and its substantial effect on the world refugee population.23
A refugee seeking asylum in the United States must establish the
eligibility of her asylum claim.24 To be eligible for asylum in the
United States, an applicant has to establish “persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”25 The
statute governing asylum law, the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), does not define the phrase “particular social group.”26
Asylees whose claims do not fit within the categories of race, religion,
nationality, or political opinion often try to fit their claims within the
undefined category of PSG.27 As a result, a court’s interpretation of
PSG can determine the outcome of a case.28 In fact, among the five

21. See id.
22. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 2009 GLOBAL TRENDS, REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PERSONS 1
(2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html (noting that South Africa
received more asylum applications than any other country in the world, and that the
United States received the second largest number of asylum applications in the world
in 2009).
23. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECH., FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2010), available at http://
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf.
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006).
25. Id.
26. See Poroj-Mejia v. Holder, 397 F. App’x 234, 237 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that
the INA does not define PSG); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985)
(noting that “Congress did not indicate what it understood [‘PSG’] to mean”), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Victoria Neilson, Symposium, Globalization, Security & Human Rights: Immigration in

the Twenty-First Century: Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based Asylum
Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 421 (2005).
27. See Poroj-Mejia, 397 F. App’x at 236; In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232;
Neilson, supra note 26, at 420 (noting that the INA does not define PSG, making it a
desirable category for leftover claims which do not fit within race, religion, nationality or political opinion).
28. See, e.g., In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom.
Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006) (dismissing the appeal for
the asylum case based on the holding that noncriminal drug informants of the Cali
drug cartel do not constitute a PSG); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-68
(B.I.A. 1996) (holding that young women in a Togolese tribe, who have not had female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and who oppose the practice, constitute a PSG); In
re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234-36 (denying eligibility for asylum based, among other factors, on the holding that Salvadoran taxi drivers do not constitute a PSG).
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grounds for asylum, PSG is the second most frequently used.29 Additionally, the definition of PSG is the most debated ground for asylum.30 For these reasons,31 the definition of this term merits analysis.
The debate about asylum law and the definition of PSG is partly informed by policy.32 Commentators advocating for a more inclusive
definition of PSG assert that asylum law should comport with the
humanitarian purpose of international refugee law.33 On the other
side of the debate, commentators in favor of restricting the definition
of PSG make arguments based on the risk of tipping the balance
struck by multilateral treaties, the risk of making the other enumerat29. See ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER & SHANE DIZON, 2 IMMIGR. LAW SERV. §
10:138 (2d ed. West 2010).
30. See James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Membership of a Particular Social
Group, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477 (2003); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238
(3d Cir. 1993) (Alito, J.) (citations omitted) (noting that “[b]oth courts and commentators have struggled to define ‘particular social group’”); Summary Conclusions:

Membership of a Particular Social Group, Expert Roundtable, San Remo, September
2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONINTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 312 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk &
Frances Nicholson eds., 2003) [hereinafter UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS]
(noting that “membership in a particular social group is the Convention ground with
the least clarity”).
31. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
32. In this policy debate, the yardstick problem of how to measure whether asylum law admits too many or too few refugees arises. The yardstick problem is best
resolved by Congress as a policy matter and is outside the scope of this Note. This
Note does, however, respond to the argument that adopting the Third and Seventh
Circuits’ approach will open the floodgates for refugees. See infra notes 35–38 and
accompanying text; infra notes 357-362 and accompanying text. The yardstick problem centers on the question of whether asylum law admits the correct number of refugees. In contrast, the floodgates argument criticizes various asylum approaches and
decisions based on fears of a dramatic increase of refugees in the United States. This
Note only tackles the floodgates argument to the extent of defending the Third and
Seventh Circuits’ approach against it, without commenting specifically on whether
the overall number of persons granted asylum in the United States is too high or too
low.
33. See Leonard Birdsong, Symposium, Immigration: To Admit or Deny?: “Give
SULTATIONS ON

Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning To
Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .”: The New Grounds for Grants of Asylum, 32
NOVA L. REV. 357, 360 (2008) (asserting that asylum law and human rights law are
closely interrelated) (citations omitted); Arlene Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right
to Asylum for People with Disabilities, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1117, 1118, 1120 (2000) (asserting that after World War II, the United States and other countries “sought to fulfill their humanitarian obligations to refugees” in the development of asylum law);
Kristen Walker, Defending the 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 583, 585 (2003) (citing James Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 173 (1990)) (rebutting
Hathaway’s argument that the 1951 Convention is about the triumph of state interest
and arguing that the 1951 Convention has a humanitarian purpose).
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ed categories redundant, and the dangers of using PSG as a “safety
net.”34
The most prominent argument in favor of restricting the definition
of PSG is based on concerns about opening the floodgates.35 Advocates of restricting asylum law argue that if the definition of PSG is
too broad, the United States will “open the floodgates” of refugees.36
Other commentators contend that floodgate concerns are unwarranted.37 These commentators base their contention on three factors: the
negligible effect of past expansions in U.S. asylum law, how floodgates fears did not materialize in other nations, and the hurdles asylum applicants must overcome to obtain asylum.38
The policy debate about U.S. asylum law can be boiled down to arguments about whether asylum laws are too inclusive or too restrictive.39 This Note advocates the position that adjudication concerning
PSG should be uniform across jurisdictions to avoid inconsistency and

34. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 158-61 (1991)
[hereinafter HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected

Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of “Membership
in a Particular Social Group,” in UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS, supra note 30,
at 285.
35. See MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION 344 (2007) (observing that there is
“a ‘Bresnahan’ concern . . . either explicitly or implicitly underpinning decisionmakers’ caution” in claims based on socio-economic deprivation and other bases);
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK
ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 27 (2007) (stating that “the deep-seated fear
persists that, absent strict migration controls, the United States risks being overwhelmed by hordes of immigrants of different races, cultures, and creeds who will
‘take over’ the country . . . . Thus, any debate about immigration—from relatively
minor efforts to more aggressive ones—must invariably confront the floodgates concern.”).
36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger:
Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 337, 380-81 (2009); Aubra Fletcher, Note, The REAL ID Act: Furthering
Gender Bias in U.S. Asylum Law, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 111, 129
(2006); Sarah Siddiqui, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group: All Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 527-28 (2010).
38. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 380-81 (citing In re Kasinga,
21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996)) (discussing how the BIA’s recognition of a social group based on female genital mutilation in Kasinga faced similar floodgate fears
which never materialized and explaining how asylees have other obstacles to surpass
after establishing membership in a social group); see Fletcher, supra note 37, at 129
(explaining the favorable experience of Canada); Siddiqui, supra note 37, at 527-28
(describing how the addition of gender as a basis for asylum had a negligible effect on
asylum applications and other elements that asylees need to prove).
39. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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arbitrariness.40 There are significant differences among the circuit
courts’ approaches to defining PSG.41 These differences come from
the circuit courts’ use of different legal tests to define PSG.42 The different approaches to defining PSG have led to a circuit split between
the Ninth Circuit, the Third and Seventh Circuits, and the circuit
courts that follow the BIA.43 Specifically, in Gatimi v. Holder, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the approach used by the BIA to define
PSG, thus moving away from the definition of PSG used by the majority of circuit courts.44 Two years later, the Third Circuit followed
suit, also rejecting the BIA’s approach.45 This Note will refer to the
Third and Seventh Circuits as the “dissenting circuits.”46
This Note analyzes the definition of PSG in asylum law. Specifically, it examines the various tests that different circuit courts use to define PSG. Rather than focus on a specific affected group,47 this Note
40. See Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan M. Weibel, Matter of S-E-G-: The Final
Nail in the Coffin for Gang-Related Asylum Claims?, 20 LA RAZA L.J. 5, 25 (2010);
Michael G. Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic Violence: An Analysis
of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 120 (2008) [hereinafter Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims]; Michele A. Voss, Note, Young and
Marked for Death: Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social Group” in Asylum
Law to Include Youth Victims of Gang Persecution, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 252-53
(2005); see also JAYA RAMI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 79 (2009) [hereinafter, RAMINOGALES, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM]; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz &
Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 295, 299 (2007).
41. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010); Gatimi v. Holder,
578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
42. See infra Part II.
43. See infra Part II (describing the conflict between the Ninth Circuit, the Third
and Seventh Circuits, and the courts that follow the BIA, which include the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits); see also infra notes
314 and accompanying text (noting that the Fifth Circuit has not taken a definitive
position on the issue); see also Bayavarpu v. Holder, 390 F. App’x 353 (5th Cir. 2010);
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203 (5th Cir. 2009); Nkwonta v.
Mukasey, 295 F. App’x 279, 285-86 (10th Cir. 2008).
44. See 578 F.3d at 615 (rejecting the BIA’s social visibility test).
45. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
22565, at *67 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).
46. Although the Ninth Circuit’s approach also differs from the approach of the
majority of the circuits that follow the BIA, the designation of “dissenting circuits”
for the approach of only the Third and Seventh Circuits is merely for purposes of
clarity and does not imply that the Ninth Circuit agrees with the circuits that follow
the BIA.
47. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37 (proposing that battered women
from severely abusive relationships should be recognized as a social group); Tessa
Davis, Note, Lost in Doctrine: Particular Social Group, Child Soldiers, and the Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Exploited Children, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653,
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looks at the definition of PSG in general, emphasizing strengths and
weaknesses of the different approaches currently practiced in the
United States. This point of view allows for a resolution to the conflict among the circuits that is not dependent on the fate of a specific
group. Part I explains the domestic and international legal framework of PSG in U.S. asylum law. Part II analyzes the different tests
that the circuit courts use to define PSG. Finally, Part III proposes a
resolution to the conflicting definitions and argues that the Third and
Seventh Circuits have formulated the best approach to defining PSG48
because the approach is easiest to apply, based on coherent statutory
analysis, and consistent with the United States’ international obligations. Given the difficulty of passing immigration legislation creating

677 (2011) (arguing that courts should recognize child soldiers as a PSG); Fatma E.
Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular

Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 78-102 (2008) (analyzing the effect
of the definition of social group on claims based on sexual orientation and gender);
Siddiqui, supra note 37 (arguing that women should be a cognizable social group);
Voss, supra note 40 (assessing the impact of the definition of social group on former
gang members).
48. For a similar argument in an article focused on a gang-related BIA case and
the problem of PSG in the context of gang-related asylum claims, see Harris &
Weibel, supra note 40, at 23 (stating that “[t]he authors are hopeful that the Seventh
Circuit’s decisions in Gatimi and Benitez Ramos will encourage other circuits to free
themselves from the confines of the Chevron deference that they have been applying
to S-E-G-’s social visibility and particularity requirements and return to the original
Acosta test as Judge Posner [of the Seventh Circuit] and other Circuit Judges, including Judge B. Fletcher [of the Ninth Circuit] suggest”); Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 22565, at *67; Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir.
2009); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). For different solutions to the problems posed by the social visibility test, see Kristin A. Bresnahan,
Note, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New “Social Visibility” Test for Deter-

mining “Membership of a Particular Social Group” in Asylum Claims and Its Legal
and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 677-78 (2011) (proposing that
the BIA adopt the approach of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”)—defining a PSG as a group that satisfies either immutable characteristics or social visibility); Brian Soucek, Comment, Social Group Asylum Claims: A Second Look at the New Visibility Requirement, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337, 338-39
(2010) (arguing that “[p]roperly interpreted, the [social] visibility criterion serves as a
test of objectivity . . . it prevents applicants from concocting ad hoc social groups in
their quest for asylum. What it does not do is demand that individuals be visually
recognizable as group members in order for courts to recognize their asylum claims,”
and that the solution should not consist of abandoning the social visibility test, but
instead, “the government need only reaffirm what should be obvious: Social visibility
has nothing to do with how groups look”).
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a uniform definition of PSG,49 this Note proposes that the Supreme
Court50 should adopt the approach of the dissenting circuits to
achieve the goals of uniformity and consistency in asylum law.
I. ASYLUM LAW
To set up the circuit split about the meaning of PSG that will be
discussed in Part II, this Part presents an overview of the domestic
and international legal framework for PSG in U.S. asylum law. It first
discusses the domestic and international legal framework, and then
goes on to present the cases that have developed the term PSG.
A. U.S. Asylum Law
The United States has a robust legal framework that shapes the
definition of PSG. The statutory basis for “membership in a particular social group” as a ground for asylum comes from the Refugee Act
of 1980, which amended the INA.51 The statute defines a “refugee”
as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or

49. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41704, TI1 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/810/.
Bills in the House and Senate propose a clarification of the definition of PSG. See
Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011); Refugee
Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011); see also 157 Cong.
Rec. H5150-02 (2011); Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 2185
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2185: (last visited Sept. 12,
2011); Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) S. 2012, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01202: (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
50. The Court has never expressly decided the meaning of PSG. See Stanley Dale
Radtke, Defining a Core Zone of Protection in Asylum Law: Refocusing the AnalyTLE

sis of Membership in a Particular Social Group to Utilize Both the Social Visibility
and Group Immutability Component Approaches, 10 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 22, 37
(2008). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on an unpublished case about the
meaning of PSG. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10, Contreras-Martinez v.
Holder, 346 F. App’x 956 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-830), 2010 WL 128010; see also
Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 8, Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956
(No. 09-830), 2010 WL 1513110. For a discussion of why this unpublished case alleging a PSG of youths who refuse to join gangs, however, was not a good vehicle for
resolving the circuit split about the meaning of PSG, see infra notes 301-306 and accompanying text.
51. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006); H. R. Rep. No. 96-781 (1980)
(Conf. Rep.) (stating how the Refugee Act of 1980 amends the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of refugee).
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herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.52

Neither the statute nor its legislative history define PSG.53 Therefore,
the statute does not determine the meaning of PSG.54
When ruling on an asylum claim, most courts look at several elements derived from both statutory and case law. First, the asylum
applicant has the burden to show that she meets the definition of refugee.55 Specifically, she has to show that she has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of one of the enumerated categories.56 Second, persecution must be caused by the government or by someone
who the government is unwilling or unable to control.57 Third, the
“nexus” requirement necessitates evidence that the persecution or
threatened persecution is “on account of” race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.58 Finally, “well-founded fear” of persecution has both objective and subjective components.59

52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006).
53. See Poroj-Mejia v. Holder, 397 F. App’x 234, 237 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that
the INA does not define social group); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232; 3-33
CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04 (2010) (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir.
1993)) (discussing the scant legislative history about the definition of social group);
Radtke, supra note 50, at 28.
54. See supra note 53.
55. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(i)
(West 2009).
56. See I.N.S. v. Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding that an asylum
applicant, who was allegedly coerced into performing military service by a Guatemalan guerilla organization, must show evidence of a “well-founded fear” of persecution
on account of his political opinion); Sangha v. I.N.S., 103 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting that an asylum applicant must show that he has a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of his political opinion).
57. See, e.g., Pavlova v. I.N.S., 441 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing BIA
asylum denial where applicant showed that the Russian government was unwilling to
control persecution of Baptists driven by religious motives); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen.,
411 F.3d 135, 160-63 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing BIA denial of asylum where country
report explained that it was futile to report slave practices of Trokosi religious sect
because the police were unwilling to stop such persecution); Singh v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d
1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04 (citing 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006)).
59. See generally GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04
(summarizing cases dealing with the subjective and objective components of the
“well-founded fear” of persecution and their implications for the asylum applicant).
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Even if an asylum applicant can establish the elements of her claim,
she may still face several hurdles before her application will be approved. For example, an application for asylum will be denied if the
applicant has participated in the persecution of others, has a prior
conviction of a serious crime, constitutes a security risk, or has firmly
resettled in a third country.60 Additionally, an asylum applicant usually must request asylum within one year of entering the United
States.61
Asylum applicants can request alternative forms of relief, such as
withholding of removal.62 Most cases that decide an applicant’s eligibility for asylum also determine eligibility for withholding of removal.63 As opposed to asylum, which is a discretionary form of relief,64
withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief.65 Yet, withholding of removal is a less appealing form of relief because it puts a
heightened burden on the applicant66 and grants a lesser immigration
status.67

60. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2) (West 2009).
61. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), 1158(a)(2)(D) (West 2009) (permitting the
consideration of an asylum application filed after the one year deadline if the applicant “demonstrates . . . the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to
the delay in filing an application.”)
62. See generally RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:15 (2d ed.
2010) (providing an overview of withholding of removal); GORDON, MAILMAN &
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.06 (presenting an overview of withholding of
removal).
63. See STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:15.
64. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West 2009) (establishing that “[t]he Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum”) (emphasis added).
65. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(A)
(West 2005) (mandating that “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”) (emphasis added).
66. See STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:8 (citing I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987)) (noting that the Supreme Court determined that asylum has a lesser
standard than the clear probability standard required for withholding of removal).
67. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 209, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159 (West 2010)
(mandating that asylum applicants are eligible for permanent resident status);
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 n.6 (noting that unlike asylum applicants, those
who have obtained withholding of removal are not eligible to become permanent residents); STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:15 (2010) (noting that withholding of removal
does not result in legal permanent resident status and only continues as long as eligibility for withholding of removal can be demonstrated).
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Depending on whether the asylum application is affirmative68 or
defensive,69 an asylum case can be decided in an asylum office or in
proceedings.70 After an interview at a local asylum office, asylum officers decide affirmative asylum applications.71 An IJ adjudicates
both affirmative asylum applications, referred by an asylum officer
for hearings, and defensive asylum applications.72 On appeal, the case
goes before the BIA.73 Further appeal can bring the case to a federal
circuit court.74
When an asylum case reaches the circuit courts, the relationship
between the administrative decisions of the BIA and the judicial decisions of the circuit courts has two aspects. First, the decisions of a circuit court are binding on the BIA when it considers cases arising in
that circuit.75 Second, in certain circumstances, the circuit courts are
required to give Chevron deference to administrative decisions of the
BIA.76 The landmark Chevron decision addressed whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision regarding polluting devices

68. Affirmative asylum applications are filed by noncitizens in valid nonimmigrant status. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02.
69. Defensive asylum applications can be filed either as “a defensive action in response to expedited removal proceedings” or as “a defensive application filed with an
immigration judge (IJ) in response to regular removal proceedings.” Id.
70. See STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:9, 8:12 (providing an overview of asylum procedure); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02 (describing
the procedures involved in an asylum application).
71. See STEEL, supra note 62, at §§ 8:9, 8:12; GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR,
supra note 53, at § 34.02.
72. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2011) (determining the jurisdiction of IJs); GORDON,
MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02.
73. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(9) (2011) (determining the BIA’s appellate jurisdiction over IJ asylum decisions); STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:12; GORDON, MAILMAN &
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02.
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005); STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:12; GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02.
75. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1217
(1991)) (asserting that “[a] federal agency is obligated to follow circuit precedent in
cases originating within that circuit” in the context of the BIA’s failure to discuss and
distinguish Ninth Circuit precedent); Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief,
Asylum Div., to All Asylum Office Staff (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2010/Asylum-Ramos-Div-2-mar2010.pdf (“The Seventh Circuit’s decision is binding on those asylum cases arising
within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit. Within the Seventh Circuit, former
gang membership may form a particular social group if the former membership is
immutable and the group of former gang members is socially distinct.”).
76. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
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was based on a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act.77 In
Chevron, the Court mandated a two-step process for courts reviewing
an agency’s construction of the statute that the agency applied.78
Chevron calls for different approaches to judicial statutory interpretation depending on whether or not Congress has addressed the
precise issue in the case.79 First, if Congress has clearly spoken on the
precise issue, then the agency and the court must give effect to Congress’ intent.80 But the court must reject administrative decisions that
contravene congressional intent because the court is the final authority on statutory interpretation.81 Second, if Congress has not addressed the precise issue, a court can construe the statute only if there
is an absence of a reasonable administrative interpretation of the issue.82 When the administrative agency has already construed a statute that is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, the court must decide whether the agency’s statutory construction is permissible.83
The issue of the meaning of PSG falls under the second step of the
Chevron analysis.84 Given that PSG is not defined in the INA,85
“Congress did not speak on the issue of what constitutes a ‘particular
social group,’ one of the five listed categories that qualify for refugee . . . within the meaning of the INA.”86 The BIA construes the
term PSG in cases determining whether an asylum applicant’s purported PSG is cognizable.87 In cases where PSG is at issue, Chevron
77. See id. at 840.
78. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444-50 (1987) (rejecting the BIA’s
legal interpretation of asylum provisions as contrary to the intent of Congress); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (citations omitted) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First
. . . is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . . If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
See generally 6-51 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.01 (2010) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
837).
79. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006).
85. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
86. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196.
87. See, e.g., id.
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requires the circuit courts to decide whether the BIA’s interpretation
of PSG is a permissible statutory construction.88
B.

International Origins of U.S. Asylum Law

U.S. asylum law fits within the larger framework of international
law. Specifically, the definition of refugee in U.S. asylum law comes
from a treaty that lays out the United States’ obligations under international refugee law.89 Under the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees (“1951 Convention”),90 a “refugee” is defined as someone who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.91

The Convention and the travaux préparatoires92 do not define
PSG.93 As part of the definition of refugee, the meaning of PSG is
88. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
89. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 1101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)
(West 2006); 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
90. The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
See 1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1 (acceding to the 1967 Protocol, the United
States became a party to the treaty in 1968); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2005) (explaining how the 1967 Protocol did not amend the 1951 Convention but instead incorporated the provisions of the
1951 Convention by reference, so by becoming a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, the
U.S. accepted the terms of the 1951 Convention).
91. 1951 Convention, supra note 89, art. 1(A)(2).
92. Travaux préparatoires are “[m]aterials used in preparing the ultimate form of
an agreement or statute, and esp., of an international treaty; the draft or legislative
history of a treaty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
93. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Rec. of
the 3d Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 14 and ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1966)) (noting that the history of the
international agreement does not shed “much light on the meaning of the phrase
‘particular social group’” because “membership in a particular social group” was added as an “afterthought” to the 1951 Convention after the Swedish representative proposed the language explaining only that “experience has shown that certain refugees
had been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups.”); Maryellen
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significant for state parties and individuals seeking asylum.94 The
Refugee Act of 1980 adopted the definition of refugee from the ratified 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”), which incorporated the 1951 Convention’s definition of refugee.95 Congress implemented the United States’ international asylum
obligations in the Refugee Act of 1980.96 In addition, Congress codified a definition of refugee that the U.S. Supreme Court described as
“virtually identical” to the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention.97 Therefore, the definition of refugee in U.S. statutory law
comes directly from international law.98
Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to
Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 509-10 (1993)
(quoting U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (1951)) (discussing how the Swedish delegate who proposed the incorporation of social group simply stated that “certain refugees have been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups,” which
does not help determine the meaning of social group); Elyse Wilkinson, Comment,

Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Social Visibility Requirement for Victims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 ME. L. REV. 387, 401 (2010) (noting how
the 1951 Convention did not define social group for the U.S or the international
community).
94. Walker, supra note 33, at 583 (citing PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE
EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 40
(1997)) (noting that “[d]efining a refugee is not an inconsequential matter; rather, it
is of practical importance and has significant consequences for both States and individuals”).
95. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006); Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102
(1980); 1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1 (ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United
States became a party to the treaty in 1968); 1951 Convention, supra note 89, art.
1(A)(2). The 1967 Protocol is persuasive authority governing domestic asylum law.
See 1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1; Abdelwahed v. INS, 22 F. App’x 811, 815
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 1967 Protocol does not give the alien any rights beyond
what is in U.S. immigration statutes and explaining that “the Protocol itself . . . is only
a guide in determining Congressional intent”). The majority view is that that the
1967 Protocol is nonself-executing, meaning that the 1967 Protocol is not binding.
See Abdelwahed, 22 F. App’x at 815 (asserting that the 1967 Protocol is not selfexecuting); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol is not self-executing); Bret Thiele, Persecution On Account Of Gender: A Need For Refugee Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMSee generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
EN’S L.J. 221, 223 (2000).
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, § 111 cmt. h, i (1987) (providing an
overview of how nonself-executing treaties are persuasive authority, as opposed to
mandatory authority, which courts are not obligated to follow).
96. See Patrick J. Glen, Is the United States Really Not a Safe Third Country?: A
Contextual Critique of the Federal Court of Canada’s Decision in Canadian Council
for Refugees, et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 587, 615 (2008)
(noting that the text and practice of U.S. asylum law is commensurate with the international provisions governing asylum).
97. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) (stating that the Congressional definition of refugee and the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention
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The international law framework for the definition of PSG in the
United States comes from the international treaties discussed above,
and from the guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (“UNHCR”). The 2002 UNHCR Guidelines shed light
on the meaning of PSG in U.S. asylum law.99 The UNHCR Guidelines instruct State parties to the 1967 Protocol to determine whether
a PSG has a common protected characteristic, and only if there is no
protected characteristic, to determine whether society recognizes the
group.100 Although the UNHCR Guidelines, a complement to the
UNHCR Handbook,101 are not binding on the United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court has given the UNHCR Handbook considerable
weight in informing the meaning of the 1967 Protocol.102 In addition,
both the BIA and the circuit courts have referred to the UNHCR
Handbook and Guidelines in determining the meaning of PSG.103
Article 1(2) are “virtually identical”); Glen, supra note 96, at 615 (noting that the text
and practice of U.S. asylum law is commensurate with the international provisions
governing asylum).
98. See Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006);
1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1; 1951 Convention, supra note 89, art. 1.
99. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on Int’l Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N.
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02, at 3 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines] (providing interpretive legal guidelines to State parties of the 1951 Protocol and/or 1967 Protocol regarding the meaning of “particular social group”).
100. See id. at 3-4 (stating that “a particular social group is a group of persons who
share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society” and that “[i]f a claimant alleges a social group that is
based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless
perceived as a cognizable group in that society”); see also Hathaway & Foster, supra
note 30, at 480-84, 489-90 (discussing how the UNHCR Guidelines purport to adopt a
merged framework using both the protected characteristics approach and the social
perception test, but do not succeed in doing so, and providing an overview of the
merits and criticisms of the protected characteristics approach and the social perception test).
101. See UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 99, at 1.
102. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 n.22 (1987) (noting that although the UNHCR Handbook does not have “the force of law . . . the Handbook
provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to
conform [and] [i]t has been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes”).
103. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing the
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(Geneva 1992)) (referring to the UNHCR Handbook as support for the statement
that a PSG does not have to be defined narrowly); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446
F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37); CastellanoChacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2003); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951,
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The UNHCR Guidelines, 1951 Convention, and 1967 Protocol are
important sources of international law for determining the definition
of PSG in U.S. asylum law.104 The United States’ intention to abide
by international law is significant in determining how courts should
define PSG.
C.

Board of Immigration Appeals and Federal Circuit Court
Cases

After having discussed the domestic and international framework
for PSG, this section provides a chronological overview of BIA and
circuit court cases that interpret PSG. This case law serves as a critical foundation for the current circuit split on the meaning of PSG.
The BIA’s interpretation of PSG informs the decisions of the circuit
courts through Chevron deference.105 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
cases in the next section serve as important precedent for the Ninth
Circuit’s approach today.106

1.

1985: The Immutable Characteristics Test

In re Acosta, the BIA’s earliest decision interpreting PSG,107 established the immutable characteristics test.108 This test requires that a
PSG share a common characteristic that is either unchangeable or
should not have to be changed.109 Acosta held that a Salvadoran cooperative organization of taxi drivers, COTAXI, does not constitute a
956-57 (B.I.A. 2006) (citing UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 99, at 2) (referring to
the UNHCR Guidelines as support for the immutable characteristics test and the social visibility test), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th
Cir. 2006); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 99, at 11, 14 (affirming the reasonableness of the BIA’s decision in
C-A- on appeal, the circuit court focused the BIA’s use of the UNHCR Guidelines
and asserted that “[r]eference to the UNHCR Guidelines by the BIA in elucidating
the Acosta formulation is permissible because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
Congress intended to conform United States refugee law with 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”).
104. See supra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 76–88 and accompanying text.
106. See infra Part II.C.
107. See Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In re Kasinga: The Decision’s Legacy, 7 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 357, 366 (1998).
108. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (holding that a particular social group
must have immutable characteristics and that a Salvadoran cooperative organization
of taxi drivers, COTAXI, does not constitute a social group); GORDON, MAILMAN &
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04.
109. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34.

STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN

262

3/9/2012 9:06 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

PSG because it does not satisfy the immutable characteristics test.110
In developing the immutable characteristics test, the court relied on
the “well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis,111 meaning literally
‘of the same kind.’ The doctrine holds that general words used in an
enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner
consistent with the specific words.”112 The BIA reasoned that the
other enumerated grounds—race, religion, nationality, and political
opinion—are immutable characteristics that an individual cannot or
should not be required to change.113 Based on ejusdem generis, the
BIA held that “the phrase ‘persecution on account of membership in
a particular social group’ . . . mean[s] persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”114 The common
characteristic “either is beyond the power of an individual to change
or . . . is so fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought not
be required to be changed.”115
Acosta provides the foundation for the definition of PSG.116 The
protected characteristics approach, otherwise known as ejusdem generis, refers to the overall methodology of statutory construction first
used by the BIA in Acosta.117 Many jurists and scholars endorse the
protected characteristics approach, which is based on Acosta’s immu-

110. See id. at 234.
111. See 82 C.J.S § 438 (2011) (citations omitted) (explaining that ejusdem generis
is a “canon of statutory construction . . . [that applies] when, as part of an enumeration in a statute, general words follow specific words, the general words are presumed
to be and are construed as restricted by the particular designations; thus the general
words include only things of the same kind, character, and nature as those specifically
enumerated”).
112. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14 (1946)); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed.
1972)).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 234.
116. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 51-52. See generally Hathaway & Foster, supra
note 30 (providing an overview of the protected characteristics theory first advanced
by Acosta’s immutable characteristics test, and describing the strengths and criticisms
of the protected characteristics approach and of the alternative approach—the social
perception test).
117. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 480 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211). The test from Acosta has been called the immutable characteristics test in
subsequent cases and commentary. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (using the
language of “common, immutable characteristic,” later coined as the name for the
test in U.S. asylum law—the immutable characteristics test).
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table characteristics test.118 The protected characteristics test is the
leading approach in common law jurisdictions.119 The major criticisms of the ejusdem generis approach used in Acosta include: the
unnecessary complexity of the test as opposed to using the plain
meaning of PSG; the test’s difficult application which requires
knowledge of other fields such as human rights; and uncertainty as to
whether groups perceived as deserving protection, such as street children, will qualify for asylum under this approach.120

118. See, e.g., Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 486 (stating that in contrast to the social perception test, “the ejusdem
generis approach is specifically conceived so as to ensure a fit between the meaning
attributed to the ‘membership of a particular social group’ ground and the other four
Convention grounds of claim, as well as to advance the purposes of the nexus clause
and Convention more generally. . . . As a matter of international law, the preceding
analysis suggests that the ejusdem generis approach ought to be preferred.”). But see
Anjana Bahl, Home is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and Gender-Based
Claims of Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33, 46 (1997) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that Acosta’s holding that members of
COTAXI did not constitute a PSG “has been criticized as being narrow and elitist
and as demonstrating a class bias in the interpretation of the term particular social
group” and that “[t]he B.I.A. neglected to consider Acosta’s case in a comprehensive
and generous manner”); Fullerton, supra note 93, at 562 (stating that Acosta’s approach “will pose a major hurdle to many groups”).
119. See, e.g., Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2004] HCA 25, ¶ 36 (concluding in an Australian case that a PSG “must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group”(emphasis
added)); Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 689 (Can.) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
211) (approving the approach in Acosta in an important Canadian Supreme Court
case that incorporated a test based on “innate, unchangeable characteristic[s]” into
Canadian refugee law); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, N.Z.A.R. 545, ¶¶ 93-106
(1999) (citing Ward, [1993] 2 SCR at 689 (Can.)) (following Ward’s protected characteristics test in a New Zealand case); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[1999] 2 A.C. 629 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211) (applying Acosta’s immutable characteristics test to define PSG in an important case from the United
Kingdom); see also Marouf, supra 47, at 53-58; Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecu-

tion” Enough? Redefining the Refugee Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. &
SOC. JUST. 519, 542-45 (2009).
120. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 480-82 (explaining that criticisms of
the protected characteristics approach include the approach’s unnecessary complexity “that could be avoided by simply giving the phrase [particular social group] its ordinary meaning,” difficult application “since it requires a knowledge of nondiscrimination and related areas of human rights law,” and uncertainty as to whether
the approach will encompass arguably deserving groups such as “street children, students, professionals, and refugee camp workers”); see also Fullerton, supra note 93,
at 562 (noting that Acosta’s standard will pose a serious obstacle to numerous
groups).
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2000: The Voluntary Association or Innate Characteristics Test

One year after Acosta, the Ninth Circuit’s Sanchez-Trujillo adopted a voluntary association test, requiring that PSGs have a common
identity based on the members’ intentional affiliations with each other.121 The court reasoned that a PSG could not simply have a distinguishing characteristic.122 Otherwise, “a statistical group of males
taller than six feet” that had a greater risk of persecution than others
would be a PSG.123 The court wanted to avoid constituting PSGs
based on “demographic division[s].”124 This fear comes from the fact
that “this court was evidently anxious to guard against ‘sweeping demographic divisions’ that encompass a plethora of different lifestyles,
varying interests, diverse cultures and contrary political leanings.”125
With these motivations in mind, the court formulated a new test
based on voluntary association.126 The Ninth Circuit explained the
voluntary association test in the following way:
[T]he phrase “particular social group” implies a collection of people
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a
voluntary associational relationship among the purported members,
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to
their identity as a member of that discrete social group.127

Based on this test, the court held that a group of young, working
class, urban males of military age was not a PSG.128
In Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit later modified the test for
PSG.129 The court expanded the voluntary association test to better
121. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986): see also Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State Actor: the
Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 775 (2003) [hereinafter Heyman, Challenge of Domestic Violence] (analyzing the rationale of the
Sanchez-Trujillo and noting how it conflicted with the BIA approach).
122. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576-77 (holding that the definition of PSG
depends on voluntary association and that a group of young, working class, urban
males of military age are not a particular social group).
123. See id. at 1576.
124. See id. at 1577.
125. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 359 (2d ed.
1998).
126. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1576-77.
129. See Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the new test for social group is based on either voluntary association or innate
characteristics), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177
(9th Cir. 2005).
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align it with the BIA’s immutable characteristics test.130 The Ninth
Circuit’s new test for PSG required voluntary association or innate
characteristics.131 For purposes of this Note, the Ninth Circuit’s test
from Hernandez-Montiel is called the “two-alternatives test.” Using
the two-alternatives test, the Ninth Circuit held that gay men with
female sexual identities were a cognizable PSG.132

3.

2006: The Social Visibility Test and Particularity Requirement

Following the lead of the Second Circuit,133 the BIA’s In re C-Aadded social visibility to the analysis of PSG.134 The social visibility
test requires that other members of the asylee’s society perceive her
group as a PSG.135 In C-A-, the BIA reviewed various approaches to
defining PSG, including the UNHCR Guidelines’ approach.136 From
this review, the BIA concluded that the definition of PSG consists of
not only the immutable characteristics test, but also requires consideration of the social visibility of the group.137 The social visibility test
requires that characteristics of the group be “recognizable and under-

130. See id. (holding that voluntary association or innate characteristics define
PSG); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04.
131. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (holding that “a ‘particular social
group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by
an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its
members that members either cannot or should not be required to change it”); see
also Heyman, Challenge of Domestic Violence, supra note 121, at 776 (describing
“the Ninth Circuit’s idiosyncratic view”).
132. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094.
133. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the definition of social group would no longer be based on the voluntary association test but
instead would be based on the immutable characteristics test with an added “visibility” requirement that the group be “identifiable to would-be persecutors”); Gomez v.
INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); GORDON, MAILMAN &
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04.
134. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. CastilloArias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALELOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04; Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65.
135. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956-57.
136. See id. at 955-61; see also Marouf, supra note 47, at 63.
137. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956-57 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec.
211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec.
439 (B.I.A. 1987)) (asserting that the BIA would “continue to adhere to the Acosta
formulation” but would “consider[] as a relevant factor the extent to which members
of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social
group”); see also Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65 (describing how the BIA continued
to use the immutable characteristics test while adding social visibility to the analysis
of social group).
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stood by others to constitute social groups.”138 The BIA held that
“noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel”
were not a PSG because they lacked social visibility,139 reasoning that
the nature of a confidential informant’s hidden identity places him
“generally out of the public view.”140 The BIA also rejected the purported PSG because the group lacked particularity.141 Most importantly, C-A- added social visibility and particularity as factors in
the analysis of PSG.142
C-A- mentioned a fourth factor in the analysis of PSG, which this
Note refers to as the “circular definition test.”143 Using this test, C-Aexcluded from the definition of a PSG any group “defined exclusively
by the fact that [the group] is targeted for persecution.”144 There is a
general point of consensus that
[A] particular social group may not be defined on the basis simply of
a shared fear of being persecuted, as to find otherwise would result
in tautological reasoning whereby a person would be at risk of being
persecuted because they were at risk of being persecuted—an outcome that would also make the nexus clause superfluous . . . .145

In other words, a PSG cannot consist of a group targeted for persecution without any other unifying characteristic or recognizable
trait.146 Without the circular definition test, a PSG defined only by
persecution would automatically satisfy the nexus element of an asylum claim, which requires persecution or fear of persecution “on account of” an unenumerated ground.147 Consequently, a circularly defined PSG would make the nexus element of an asylum claim

138. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959.
139. Id. at 961.
. 140. Id. at 960.
141. See id. at 957(finding that “noncriminal informants” is a group “too loosely
defined to meet the requirement of particularity”). The particularity requirement
demands that a PSG not be too “amorphous” or “indeterminate.” See In re A-M-E-,
24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); infra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
142. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957–60; 3-33 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALELOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04; Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65.
143. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960 (citing UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note
99, at ¶ 2) (noting that a PSG could not be defined solely by being persecuted).
144. Id.
145. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 479.
146. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
147. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 479; supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary, contravening congressional intent.148 This uncontroversial reasoning149 has been adopted by many circuit courts.150
The commentary and response to C-A- highlight the strengths and
weaknesses of the decision. Some commentators praise C-A- and the
addition of social visibility to the analysis of social group.151 While
others strongly criticize the decision as inaccurately portraying cases
from the past and not acknowledging a departure from precedent.152
Some commentators contend that C-A- mischaracterized the
UNHCR Guidelines as support for the social visibility test.153 Com148. Cf. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 479 (discussing the same circularity
problem in the international context).
149. See id. (noting that there is a general consensus around the requirement that a
PSG not be defined exclusively by persecution).
150. See, e.g., Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a PSG
of “women subjected to rape as a method of government control” because it is circularly defined by persecution); Bayavarpu v. Holder, 390 F. App’x 353 (5th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting a PSG because the group is defined exclusively by being targeted for persecution); Velasquez-Garzon v. Att’y Gen., 387 F. App’x 295, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting PSG, among other reasons, for being defined only by persecution); Lushaj v.
Holder, 380 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting a PSG cannot be circularly defined
only by persecution); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted) (asserting that a PSG must not be “defined exclusively by the fact that its
members have been targeted for persecution”); Nkwonta v. Mukasey, 295 F. App’x
279, 286 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (asserting that “it is an impermissible circular definition, defining a group in terms of those who suffer persecution”); CastilloArias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that “risk of persecution alone does not create a particular social group”); Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d
551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “a social group may not be circularly defined by
the fact that it suffers persecution. The individuals in the group must share a narrowing characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted.”).
151. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Major Developments in Asylum Law over the Past
Year, 83 No. 34 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1889, 1894 (2006) (using the UNHCR
Guidelines and Second Circuit precedent to support the assertion that the addition of
social visibility to the analysis of social group “appears to be on more solid ground”).
152. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65 (criticizing C-A- as not acknowledging a
departure from precedent, not adopting the social perception test as laid out in the
UNHCR Guidelines and incorrectly describing how past cases were based on socially
visible characteristics).
153. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 13; Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65
(criticizing C-A- as not adopting the social perception test as laid out in the UNHCR
Guidelines); see also Danielle L.C. Beach, Battlefield of Gendercide: Forced Marriages and Gender-Based Grounds for Asylum and Related Relief, 09-12 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)); Marouf, supra
note 47, at 49) (“Marouf’s insightful analysis found that the Board’s ‘social visibility’
requirement diverges from the international accepted approach of discerning a social
group, undermines the principle framework of analysis set forth in Acosta, and ‘will
lead to incoherent, inconsistent decisions’ that have no basis under international
law.”).
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mentators point out that the BIA’s interpretation of social visibility
significantly diverges from the UNHCR’s interpretation.154 The
UNHCR follows both the protected characteristics and the social perception approaches, and presents them as alternative approaches to
defining PSG.155 In contrast to the protected characteristics approach
that focuses on the internal characteristics of a group,156 the social
perception approach looks at the external perception of a group in a
given society and the perception of persecutors.157
The BIA’s interpretation of “social visibility” in C-A-, however, diverged from the international community’s understanding of the ‘social perception’ approach, as it focused on the visibility of group
members rather than whether the group as a whole was recognized
by society, and stressed a subjective rather than an objective standard.158

In three subsequent cases, A-M-E-, S-E-G- and E-A-G-, the BIA
established the use of social visibility as a requirement for a PSG.159
This further diverges from the UNHCR Guidelines which present
protected characteristics and social perception as alternative approaches, not dual requirements, to defining PSG.160 The UNHCR
presented its own view on the BIA’s social visibility test in an amicus
brief asserting that the BIA’s social visibility test was inconsistent
with the UNHCR Guidelines.161 The UNHCR’s amicus brief lends

154. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. CastilloArias, 446 F.3d 1190; Marouf, supra note 47, at 49 (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir.
2007).
155. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 49.
156. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 483 (citing Applicant “A” and Anor
v. MIMA (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.)) (noting how the social perception is embraced by the Australian courts, as evidenced by the leading case of Applicant A v.
MIMA).
158. Marouf, supra note 47, at 49.
159. See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008); In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73-75; GORDON,
MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04; Harris & Weibel, supra note 40,
at 5; Marouf, supra note 47, at 65-67 (discussing In re A-M-E-’s adoption of the social
visibility test as an additional requirement (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69)).
160. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 49; supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Brief of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in the matter of Michelle Thomas et
al. (2007) [hereinafter UNHCR, Amicus Curiae in Thomas] (amicus brief for an unpublished BIA case); Elizabeth A. James, Comment, Is the U.S. Fulfilling Its Obligations Under the 1951 Refugee Convention? The Colombian Crisis in Context, 33
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support to the divergence of the BIA’s social visibility test in C-Afrom the UNHCR’s approach in the Guidelines.162

4.

2007-2008: The Particularity Requirement

The BIA’s In re A-M-E-, In re S-E-G- and In re E-A-G- established social visibility and particularity as requirements for PSG qualification.163 Particularity requires that the PSG not be “amorphous,”
“indeterminate,” or “too subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide
the sole basis for membership in a particular social group.”164 These
cases shifted the focus of the analysis away from immutable characteristics to social visibility either by relying on social visibility to invalidate a PSG that satisfied the immutable characteristics test, or by
discussing social visibility in significantly greater detail than immutable characteristics.165 These decisions, together with C-A-, were designed to “give greater specificity” to the definition of PSG.166 In S-EG-, the BIA rejects the PSG of youths who resist gang membership
for lack of social visibility and particularity.167 This case provides a
critical foundation for understanding the Ninth Circuit’s special
treatment of youths who resist gang membership.168 The BIA and
circuit court cases mentioned in this section set the stage for the dis-

N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 455, 504 (2008); Marouf, supra note 47, at 65 (citations
omitted); Wilkinson, supra note 93, at 410.
162. See UNHCR, Amicus Curiae in Thomas, supra note 161; James, supra note
161, at 504 (2008); Marouf, supra note 47, at 65; Wilkinson, supra note 93, at 410.
163. See supra note 159.
164. In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76.
165. See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593-96 (B.I.A. 2008) (analyzing the alleged PSG mostly under the social visibility test with less attention given to analysis
under the immutable characteristics test); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-84,
586-88 (B.I.A. 2008) (noting that an age-based PSG might be cognizable under immutable characteristics but holding that youths who resist gang recruitment does not
constitute a PSG under the social visibility test); In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 7375 (noting that while wealth might satisfy the immutable characteristics test, the IJ
correctly ruled that the category of wealthy Guatemalans does not constitute a PSG
because it fails under the social visibility test).
166. See In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582.
167. See id. at 585-87 (holding that the group lacked social visibility because there
is insufficient evidence that Salvadoran youths who refuse to join gangs are seen as a
group by society or that they suffer a higher incidence of crime than the general population, and holding that the group lacked particularity because “[t]hey make up a
potentially large and diffuse segment of society, and the motivation of gang members
in recruiting and targeting young males could arise from motivations quite apart from
any perception that the males in question were members of a class”).
168. See infra Part II.C.
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cussion of the circuit split surrounding the definition of PSG in Part
II.
II. CONFLICT: THE DEFINITION OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
The circuit courts have different approaches to defining PSG in
asylum cases. This circuit split has significant effects because each
circuit’s precedent binds the immigration agency’s proceedings within
the circuit.169 This Part explains the circuit split by first discussing the
approach of the circuit courts that follow the BIA, then by examining
the Seventh Circuit’s approach and the subsequent Third Circuit decision adopting that approach, and finally by presenting the Ninth
Circuit’s approach. This Part concludes with a discussion of the justifications and criticisms of each approach to defining PSG.
A. Circuits that Follow the Board of Immigration Appeals:
Immutable Characteristics, Social Visibility, and Particularity
The majority of circuit courts follow the BIA’s approach to defining PSG. The First Circuit,170 Second Circuit,171 Third Circuit,172
169. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
170. See Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing In re A-M-E-,
24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) , aff’d
sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006)) (establishing
the First Circuit standard that “[i]n addition to immutability, the BIA requires that a
‘particular social group’: (1) have ‘social visibility,’ meaning that members possess
‘characteristics . . . visible and recognizable by others in the [native] country’; (2) be
defined with sufficient particularity to avoid indeterminacy,” and rejecting drug
smuggling informants as a PSG for lack of social visibility); see also Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting “secularized and westernized Pakistanis perceived to be affiliated with the United States” as a PSG for lack of particularity
and social visibility); Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting
“young Guatemalan men recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment” as
a PSG for lack of social visibility and particularity); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602
F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting proposed PSG of “young women recruited by
gang members who resist such recruitment” for lack of visibility and particularity);
Faye v. Holder, 580 F.3d 37, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting proposed PSG of “women
who had a child out of wedlock/are considered adulterers because they gave birth to
a child allegedly not their husband’s/have been abused by their husbands” based on
lack of social visibility and particularity).
171. See Lushaj v. Holder, 380 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting proposed
PSG of “women whom ‘members of the Haklaj gang wished to kidnap . . . and force .
. . into prostitution, at least in part to punish [their] family members for their political
activities in Albania’” for lack of social visibility because not perceived as a discrete
group by Albanian society); Qeta v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting PSG of “young single women in Albania who do not have male relatives to
protect them from sex traffickers” because the group lacked a common immutable
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Fourth Circuit,173 Sixth Circuit,174 Eighth Circuit,175 Tenth Circuit,176
and Eleventh Circuit177 use the social visibility test and particularity

characteristic, social visibility, and particularity); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d
70, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding, after a discussion of social visibility and particularity, that “[t]he BIA’s interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘particular social group’ . . .
was . . . reasonable” and rejecting PSG of “affluent Guatemalans” for lack of particularity).
172. See Velasquez-Garzon v. Att’y Gen., 387 F. App’x 295 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting proposed PSG of “FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces in Columbia] victims”
for lack of immutable characteristic, and rejecting proposed PSG of “person[s] who
would be able to provide some service to the FARC” as too vague, lacking particularity); Galindo-Torres v. Att’y Gen., 348 F. App’x 814, 816, 817-18 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting “influential, respected business people who refuse to aid, join or support the
FARC” as PSG for lack of social visibility and particularity); cf. Gomez-Zuluaga v.
Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348 (3d Cir. 2008) (accepting PSG of “women who have escaped involuntary servitude after being abducted and confined by the FARC” under
the immutable characteristics test).
173. See Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125-26 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that the family members of “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by
agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” satisfies immutable characteristics, social visibility and particularity); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d. 440, 444 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the proposed PSG of “young, Americanized well-off Salvadoran male deportees
with criminal histories who oppose gangs” for lack of immutability, particularity, and
social visibility); Bermudez-Botero v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69; In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951) (rejecting
PSG based on the BIA’s analytical framework set out in C-A- and A-M-E-); Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958-59 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting “adolescents in El Salvador who refuse to join the gangs of that country because
of their opposition to the gangs’ violent and criminal activities” as PSG for lack of
social visibility and particularity).
174. See Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting PSG
of “business owners who refuses [sic] to pay for protection from the mafia”); Qu v.
Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir.
2006)) (holding that “women in China who have been subjected to forced marriage
and involuntary servitude” constitute a PSG based on the immutable characteristics
test); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (asserting that, although
the court did not need to reach the issue of PSG, the PSG likely does not meet the
social visibility or particularity requirements); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360,
366-67 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that former gang member is a PSG because “it is impossible for Urbina-Mejia to change his membership in the group of the former 18th
Street gang members,” and noting that “[i]t is not that he is unwilling to cast off gang
membership; indeed, he came to the United States in order to escape the gang,” but
stating that “once one has left the gang, one is forever a former member of that
gang”).
175. See Costanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that proposed PSG of “a family that experienced gang violence” failed for lack of social visibility and particularity, and proposed PSG of “persons resistant to gang violence”
failed under particularity); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir.
2008) (rejecting proposed PSG of Guatemalan family business owners for lack of
“social visibility to be perceived as a group by society” and for lack of particularity as
it was “too amorphous to adequately describe a social group”).

STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN

272

3/9/2012 9:06 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

as requirements for a cognizable PSG. Even though the immutable
characteristics test has a less important role in the analysis of PSG,
these circuit courts continue to refer to the immutable characteristics
test from Acosta in their cases.178
The social visibility test, from C-A-, A-M-E and other BIA decisions, has been engrafted on top of the immutable characteristics test
and often plays a significant role in the analysis of PSG.179 In Mendez-Barrera, the First Circuit relied on social visibility as a basis for

176. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1228-29, 1231, 1235 (10th Cir.
2011) (holding that PSG of “women in El Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25
who resisted gang recruitment” fails social visibility and that the group meets the
freshly-adopted particularity requirement).
177. See Pierre v. U.S. Att’y General, No. 09-1624, 2011 WL 2506053, at *2 (11th
Cir. June 24, 2011) (rejecting argument that social visibility should not be the law because of the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier decision affirming the use of the social visibility test in Castillo-Arias); Vasquez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 345 F. App’x 441, 446-47 (11th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting PSG of “young Salvadoran students who expressly
oppose gang practices and values and who wish to protect their family members
against such practices” for lack of social visibility and particularity).
178. See Rivera-Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1229 (referring to immutable characteristics without relying on it because the BIA did not base its decision on the immutable
characteristics test); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Castellano-Chacon v.
INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)) (using the language from Acosta of “common, immutable characteristic”); Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x at 958; Davila-Mejia, 531
F.3d at 629; Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2007); GalindoTorres, 348 F. App’x 814, 817 (3d Cir. 2009) (mentioning but not relying on the immutable characteristics test because the BIA did not base its decision on immutability); Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 445; Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir.
2009) (noting the BIA requires that the purported PSG satisfy the immutable characteristics test); supra Part I.C.1.
179. See Rivera-Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1234 (citations omitted) (holding that “we
therefore join those circuits that have accepted the BIA’s social visibility test in interpreting the statute”); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137 (noting that “an alleged
social group must be . . . socially visible”); Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x at 958
(noting that the a social group must have social visibility); Galindo-Torres, 348 F.
App’x at 817 (citations omitted) (noting that a social group “must . . . exhibit a shared
characteristic that is socially visible to others in the community”); Scatambuli, 558
F.3d at 59 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (following the
BIA’s approach where “the BIA requires that a particular social group . . . have social visibility”); Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 446 (citations omitted) (holding that the
“purported group . . . fails the social visibility test” because they are not “generally
recognizable by others in the community”); Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d at 629 (holding
that “petitioners . . . failed to establish that their status as ‘competing family business
owners’ gave them sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society”);
Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 (affirming the BIA’s social visibility test); see also supra
notes 134-138, 142 and accompanying text (defining the social visibility test and discussing its development in BIA precedential case-law).
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rejecting the PSG.180 In this case, the First Circuit held that “young
women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment” did
not constitute a PSG for lack of social visibility.181 The court explained that to satisfy social visibility, a group “must be generally recognized in the community as a cohesive group.”182 In discussing social
visibility, the court highlighted that “[t]he petitioner failed to provide
even a scintilla of evidence to this effect. By the same token, she
failed to pinpoint any group characteristics that render members of
the putative group socially visible in El Salvador.”183
The additional requirement of particularity also plays an important
role in the analysis of PSG.184 In Ucelo-Gomez, the Second Circuit
held that “affluent Guatemalans” could not be a cognizable PSG for
lack of particularity.185 The court discussed the BIA’s observation
that if affluence in Guatemala were defined as not living in poverty,
then twenty percent of the population would be considered affluent.186 The court noted that:
[T]he BIA must not mean that a group’s size can itself be a sound
reason for finding a lack of particularity. Instead, we interpret the
BIA’s observation as merely illustrating how “the concept of wealth

180. See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2010).
181. See id. (holding that young men who resisted gang membership did not constitute a PSG based on lack of social visibility and particularity).
182. Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. See Rivera-Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1231 (holding that “we therefore defer to
the BIA’s formulation of ‘particular social group’ as requiring the group be defined
with particularity”); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011); BermudezBotero v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that particularity is a
required criterion for a cognizable PSG); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137 (noting
that “[a]n alleged social group must be . . . particular”); Contreras-Martinez, 346 F.
App’x at 958-59 (noting that a social group cannot be “inchoate,” “diffuse,” or indeterminate); Galindo-Torres, 348 F. App’x at 817 (citations omitted) (noting that a social group must “be defined with sufficient particularity”); Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 59
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (following the BIA’s approach
where “the BIA requires that a particular social group . . . be defined with sufficient
particularity to avoid indeterminacy”); Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 446 (citations omitted) (concluding that the “proposed group lacks particularity . . . because its members
‘make up a potentially large and diffuse segment of society’”); Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d
at 629 (concluding that petitioners failed to establish that the social group was sufficiently particular); Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 (affirming the BIA’s particularity
requirement); see also supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
185. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 72-74 (holding that “affluent Guatemalans” were
not a PSG for lack of social visibility and particularity).
186. See id. at 73 (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76 n.8).
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is so indeterminate”—the purported social group could vary from
one to twenty percent of the total population.187

The court then explained that “[t]his indeterminacy is a relevant
consideration in light of In re C-A-’s concerns about groups that are
‘too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.’”188 An
important rationale underlying the approach of the circuit courts that
follow the BIA is the application of Chevron deference to the BIA’s
definition of PSG, which will be discussed further at the end of Part
II.189
B.

Third and Seventh Circuits: Immutable Characteristics and
Rejection of Social Visibility and Particularity

Continuing to adhere to the immutable characteristics test, the dissenting circuits have rejected the social visibility test and the particularity requirement.190 In Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit rejected the BIA’s social visibility test.191 The Court held that “defectors
from the Mungiki” constitute a PSG.192 Distinguishing the present
case from the Supreme Court’s Gonzales v. Thomas, which directed
the circuit courts to give deference to the BIA’s definition of PSG,
the Seventh Circuit contrasted the prior silence of the BIA on the
PSG at issue in Thomas with the inconsistent use of social visibility in
past BIA decisions.193 Chevron deference does not apply where the
agency’s ruling is inconsistent with past decisions.194 Judge Posner as-

187. Id. at 73 n.2 (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76).
188. See id. (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub
nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006)).
189. See infra Part II.D.1 (explaining the role of Chevron deference in the approaches of the circuit courts).
190. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
22565, at *67 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting social visibility and particularity); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the particularity requirement); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the social visibility test).
191. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615-16; see also Eugenia Pyntikova, Seventh Circuit

Decision in Gatimi v. Holder Rejects Social Visibility as Necessary Criterion for
Membership in a “Particular Social Group”, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 101, 101-05 (2009).
192. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616. The Mungiki is a violent Kenyan political and
religious group that compels the wives of members and defectors to undergo female
genital mutilation.
193. See id. at 615-16 (citing Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per
curiam)) (discussing whether a family could be a PSG).
194. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 11 (explaining that Chevron does not
apply to an agency’s inconsistent approach (citing Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def.
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serted that social visibility “makes no sense” and that the BIA has not
even tried to explain the reasoning behind social visibility.195 Additionally, social visibility would lead to perverse results because “[i]f
you are a member of a group that has been targeted for . . . persecution, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible.”196 The court
continued by noting that “[t]he only way, on the Board’s view, that
the Mungiki defectors can qualify as members of a particular social
group is by pinning a target to their backs with the legend ‘I am a
Mungiki defector.’”197 Later, in Benitez Ramos v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the social visibility test.198 Furthermore, in the dicta of Benitez Ramos, the Seventh Circuit rejected
the particularity requirement.199
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Third Circuit also rejected social visibility and particularity.200 In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the
Third Circuit rejected social visibility for largely the same reasons
that the Seventh Circuit’s Gatimi rejected this BIA test.201 Quoting
heavily from Gatimi, Chief Judge McKee indicated his circuit’s approval of the Seventh Circuit’s approach.202 Additionally, the Third
Circuit rejected the particularity requirement in the following way:
[W]e are hard-pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of “particularity” and the discredited requirement of “social visibility.” Indeed, they appear to be different articulations of
the same concept and the government’s attempt to distinguish the
two oscillates between confusion and obfuscation . . . . “Particularity” appears to be little more than a reworked definition of “social
visibility” . . . .203

Based on this understanding of particularity as a reformulation of social visibility, the court rejected particularity for the same reasons it
rejected social visibility.204 Specifically, McKee described particularity
as “unreasonable” because it is inconsistent with earlier BIA deciCouncil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))); Marouf, supra note 47, at 68 (citing Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)).
195. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
198. See 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
199. See id. at 431.
200. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
22565, at *67 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).
201. Compare id. at *53-*64, with Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615-16.
202. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22565, at *56-*60.
203. Id. at *66-*67.
204. See id.
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sions.205 Based on the inconsistency of these tests with prior BIA decisions, the Third Circuit held that social visibility and particularity
are not entitled to Chevron deference, and declined to follow the
BIA’s approach.206
C. Ninth Circuit: Voluntary Association or Innate
Characteristics Test, or the Application of Chevron Deference
In defining PSG, the Ninth Circuit has a dual approach that depends on the facts of the case.207 When the BIA has decided a precedential case about a very similar group, the Ninth Circuit gives Chevron deference to the BIA’s approach to defining PSG.208 When the
BIA has not ruled about a very similar group in a precedential decision, the Ninth Circuit uses its own two-alternatives test.209 The Ninth
Circuit’s two-alternatives test for PSG requires voluntary association
or innate characteristics.210 According to the Ninth Circuit, “[a] ‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that
members either cannot or should not be required to change it.”211
This two-alternatives test comes from Ninth Circuit precedent.212
In Perdomo v. Holder, a case about a group that the BIA had not
previously ruled on in a precedential decision, the Ninth Circuit used

205. See id. at *67.
206. See id.
207. For a recent case that does not follow this dual approach but instead seems to
use a mix of the two approaches without giving a satisfying explanation of the court’s
methodology, see Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that proposed PSG failed the two-alternatives test in part because the group
did not possess social visibility and particularity, thus presenting a mixed approach of
the two-alternatives test and Chevron deference). This mixed approach can be better
understood by looking at Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2007),
which the Velasco-Cervantes court cited as the source for the proposition that the
two-alternatives test is given content by social visibility and particularity.
208. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855-56, 858 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing In
re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582, 583 (B.I.A. 2008)) (determining that Chevron
deference is due to the BIA’s analysis of the proposed PSG of Guatemalan youths
who refuse to join gangs based on the BIA’s earlier precedential decision in S-E-G-,
which rejected those who resist recruiting by a Salvadoran gang as a PSG); cf. infra
notes 228-230 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s Skidmore deference to non-precedential BIA decisions).
209. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010).
210. See id.
211. Id. (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)).
212. See supra Part I.C.2.
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its two-alternatives approach to define PSG.213 Perdomo held that
the BIA erred in concluding that women in Guatemala could not be a
cognizable PSG.214 The Court began its analysis of PSG by noting
that “[t]he BIA has not yet specifically addressed in a precedential
decision whether gender by itself could form the basis of a particular
social group.”215 After mentioning the BIA’s precedential decision in
Kasinga, holding that women in a particular tribe who oppose FGM
constitute a PSG,216 the court explained that “[w]hether females in a
particular country, without any other defining characteristics, could
constitute a protected social group remains an unresolved question
for the BIA.”217 Then the court reviewed the development of its own
two-alternatives test and case law on gender.218 Finally, the court remanded the case back to the BIA to determine whether women in
Guatemala were a cognizable PSG “[b]ecause the BIA failed to apply
both prongs of the Hernandez-Montiel definition to Perdomo’s claim
that women in Guatemala constitute a particular social group and because the BIA’s decision is inconsistent with its own opinions in
Acosta
and
C-A-.”219 Given that gender-based claims have been largely unsuccessful in the past,220 this Ninth Circuit decision was truly one of a few
“broad-based, dramatic decisions in the past year.”221
In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit gave Chevron deference to
the BIA’s precedential decision about a similar PSG.222 In S-E-G-,
the BIA firmly established as precedent that Salvadoran youths resisting gang membership do not constitute a PSG.223 The Ninth Cir213. See 611 F.3d at 669.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 666.
216. See id. (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996)).
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 669 (citations omitted).
220. See generally Siddiqui, supra note 37 (arguing that women should constitute a
particular social group given the challenges that women asylum seekers face).
221. Gerald Seipp, A Year in Review: Social Visibility Doctrine Still Alive, but
Questioned, 87 No. 27 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417, 1417 (2010).
222. See Ramos Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (asserting that
Chevron deference be given to the BIA’s analysis of the purported PSG of Guatemalan youths who refuse to join gangs); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 856 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding that Chevron deference is due to the BIA’s interpretation of the
alleged PSG of Salvadoran youths who refuse to join gangs).
223. See In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting PSG of
“Salavadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment” for lack of social visibility
and particularity).
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cuit explained that the BIA expected the reasoning of S-E-G- to apply to other gangs in different countries.224 As a result, the Ninth Circuit gave Chevron deference to the BIA’s approach in S-E-G- in two
cases dealing with youths who resist gang membership, Ramos Barrios and Ramos-Lopez.225 In these two cases, the court affirmed the
BIA’s analysis of PSG based on social visibility and particularity, instead of applying the Ninth Circuit’s own two-alternatives test.226 The
Ninth Circuit’s use of Chevron deference depends on the putative
PSG in a given case.227
The Ninth Circuit’s deference to the BIA has an additional layer of
complexity. An en banc Ninth Circuit case from March 2009 clarified
that the analysis of PSG should proceed under Chevron if the BIA
has already made a precedential ruling on a similar PSG.228 This clarification further explains that Chevron deference is due to the BIA’s
interpretation of the term’s definition in precedential cases, while
Skidmore deference is due to the BIA’s interpretation in nonprecedential decisions.229 Following this methodology, the Ninth Cir224. See Ramos Barrios, 581 F.3d at 855 n.4 (noting that “[t]he BIA’s reasoning in
Matter of S-E-G- is no less applicable to the Mara 13 (or an equivalent gang) in Guatemala [than in El Salvador]”); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860.
225. See Ramos Barrios, 581 F.3d at 856, 858-60 (asserting that Chevron deference
be given to the BIA’s analysis of the purported PSG of Guatemalan youths who refuse to join gangs); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860 (holding that Chevron deference is
due to the BIA’s interpretation of the alleged PSG of Salvadoran youths who refuse
to join gangs).
226. See Ramos Barrios, 581 F.3d at 855 (noting that the PSG in Ramos-Lopez was
rejected for lack of social visibility and particularity, reasoning that the argument for
PSG here is “indistinguishable from the argument made in Ramos-Lopez,” and thus
rejecting the PSG); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 862 (holding that “it was reasonable
for the BIA to conclude that the group was not sufficiently particular . . . [and] that
the groups lacked social visibility”).
227. See supra notes 207-209, 222-226 and accompanying text.
228. See Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 858, 860 n.4 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder,
558 F.3d 903, 908-12 (9th Cir. 2009); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir.
2008)) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s March 2009 en banc decision in MarmolejoCampos “clarified the method by which we determine the degree of deference owed
to BIA decisions” and holding that “the BIA’s determination, in a published disposition, that a group is or is not a ‘particular social group’” was due Chevron deference).
229. See Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 909-11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) (noting that “[u]nder Skidmore, the measure of deference
afforded to the agency varies depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control” and that the Ninth Circuit accords Chevron deference to precedential
BIA decisions and Skidmore deference to nonprecedential BIA decisions); see also
Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860 n.4 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
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cuit gave Skidmore deference to a non-precedential BIA decision in a
recent case.230 The analysis in this section focuses on Ninth Circuit
cases that come after this analytical clarification.231
D. Justifications and Criticisms of the Different Approaches to
Defining Particular Social Group
The approaches of the circuit courts that follow the BIA, the dissenting circuits, and the Ninth Circuit each have strengths and weaknesses.232 This Section explores the justifications and criticisms of
each approach through several lenses, including Chevron deference,233 social visibility,234 and the Ninth Circuit’s two-alternatives
test.235

ted) (“We first had occasion to consider the BIA’s decision in In re S-E-G- in SantosLemus v. Mukasey. We did not analyze the BIA’s decision under the Chevron
framework, noting instead that the BIA’s decision was not binding on us. We decided Santos-Lemus, however, before our en banc decision in Marmolejo-Campos, in
which we clarified the method by which we determine the degree of deference owed
to BIA decisions. Thus, to the extent Santos-Lemus is inconsistent with MarmolejoCampos, the later en banc decision must control.”). The BIA’s precedential decisions are published while the BIA’s nonprecedential decisions are unpublished. See
Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 908-12.
230. See Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1164 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“When, as here, the BIA’s decision is an
unpublished decision by one member of the BIA, we give Skidmore deference to the
BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations, recognizing that,
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [these interpretations] do constitute a body of experience.”) Soriano further explained that some
analysis of the alleged PSG beyond Chevron deference was necessary because the
BIA had ruled in a precedential decision on “noncriminal drug informants working
against the Cali drug cartel who act out of a sense of civic duty and moral responsibility,” Id. at 1165, which was distinguishable from the group at hand of “criminal government informant[s] who neither act[] from altruistic motives nor turn[] in participants in a drug cartel,” and subsequently finding that the group does not constitute a
PSG for lack of innate characteristics under the two-alternatives test. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra Part II.A (characterizing the approach of the circuit courts that follow the BIA by the use of immutable characteristics, social visibility, and particularity); supra Part II.B (explaining that the Third and Seventh Circuits use the immutable characteristics test and reject both social visibility and particularity); supra Part
II.C (showing that the Ninth Circuit’s approach entails the two-alternatives test,
comprised of innate characteristics or voluntary association, or the application of
Chevron deference).
233. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part I.C.2.
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The Application of Chevron Deference

Chevron deference plays a crucial role in all three approaches to
defining PSG. The circuit courts following the BIA justify their adoption of the BIA’s approach to defining PSG with the Chevron doctrine.236 Chevron deference plays an important role here because, according to the Supreme Court, “judicial deference to the Executive
Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context”237 and in
the context of defining PSG.238 Given that PSG is not defined in the
INA,239 circuit courts must decide whether the immigration agency’s
interpretation of PSG is a permissible construction of the INA.240
When these circuit courts find that the BIA’s construction of the statute is reasonable, they give Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of PSG in the INA.241 Generally, the circuit courts following
236. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (citations omitted)
(10th Cir. 2011); Bermudez-Botero v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984)); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 991 (6th Cir. 2009); Galindo-Torres v.
Att’y Gen., 348 F. App’x 814, 817 (3d Cir. 2009); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53,
58 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 397 (1st Cir. 2004)); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2008); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir.
2006).
237. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
238. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (requiring the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to remand the case to the BIA for consideration of the alien’s
eligibility for asylum based on membership in the PSG of a particular family, rather
than considering de novo the question of whether the particular family constituted a
PSG where the BIA had not yet considered this PSG); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d
611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales, 547 U.S. 183) (distinguishing deference for
the BIA’s social visibility test from the BIA’s determination of whether a particular
family constitutes a PSG in Gonzales by noting that “[w]e are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition to the courts of appeals . . . that the Board’s definition of
‘particular social group’ is entitled to deference. The issue in that case was whether a
family could be a particular social group, a difficult issue on which the Board had not
opined; and the Court held that the Board should have an opportunity to do so. But
regarding ‘social visibility’ as a criterion for determining ‘particular social group,’ the
Board has been inconsistent rather than silent”). See generally Supreme Court Finds

“Membership in Particular Social Group” Must First Be Determined by Agency Not
Court, 83 No. 17 INTERPRETER RELEASES 769 (2006) (providing a history and overview of Gonzales).
239. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
240. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984); see also supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
241. See Bermudez-Botero, 375 F. App’x at 316 (noting that “this court will defer
to the Board’s ‘reasonable interpretation’ of the term” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843-44)); Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 991 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that “substantial deference is given to the BIA’s interpretation of
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the BIA apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of
PSG, and consequently determine that immutable characteristics, social visibility, and particularity constitute a permissible statutory construction of PSG.242
To illustrate, the Eleventh Circuit applies Chevron deference to
the definition of PSG in the following way. The Eleventh Circuit explains the meaning of permissible statutory construction by specifying
that “[a]n agency’s interpretation is deemed reasonable unless it is
‘arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law.’”243 In CastilloArias, the Eleventh Circuit framed the analysis by declaring, “we
must follow the BIA’s determination that noncriminal informants
working against the Cali cartel are not a social group under the INA
unless the interpretation is unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary, capricious, or
clearly contrary to law.”244 Then, the court determined that the BIA’s
tests used to define PSG and their application to the facts were reasonable.245 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit and the other circuits
that follow the BIA justify their recent adoption of the social visibility
and particularity tests (in addition to the older immutable characteristics test) using Chevron.246
In contrast, the dissenting circuits do not apply Chevron deference
to the BIA’s construction of PSG.247 By way of rejecting the ap-

the INA” and that “[t]he BIA’s interpretation of the statute and regulations will be
upheld unless the interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute”); Galindo-Torres, 348 F. App’x at 817 (citations omitted) (explaining that
because of the ambiguity of the statutory phrase “particular social group,” the court
has generally given deference to the BIA’s interpretation); Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 58
(quoting Elien, 364 F.3d at 397) (asserting that “[w]hen a statute is silent or ambiguous, therefore, we uphold the implementing agency’s statutory interpretation, provided it is ‘reasonable’ and consistent with the statute”); Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d at
627 (noting that the court accords “substantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation
of the statutes . . . it administers”); Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 72 (analyzing whether
the “BIA’s construction [of social group] was a reasonable interpretation of the statute”); Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1195-96 (citations omitted) (discussing the application of Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of PSG “unless the interpretation is unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the law”).
242. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text;
supra note 236.
243. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1195 (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 22 F.3d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1994)); cf. supra Part II.C. (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s application of Chevron based on whether the BIA has already
ruled on a very similar group to the alleged PSG in the case at hand).
244. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196.
245. See id. at 1196-99.
246. See supra note 236.
247. See supra notes 193-194, 206 and accompanying text.
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proach of the BIA (that the majority of circuits follow), the Seventh
Circuit’s Gatimi v. Holder stated that Chevron should not apply because of the inconsistent use of social visibility in past BIA decisions.248 Referring to this inconsistency, Judge Posner, in Gatimi, explains that the BIA “has found groups to be ‘particular social groups’
without reference to social visibility, as well as, in this and other cases,
refusing to classify socially invisible groups as particular social groups
but without repudiating the other line of cases.”249 Furthermore,
“[w]hen an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court
cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer to that one,” and
“[s]uch picking and choosing would condone arbitrariness and usurp
the agency’s responsibilities.”250 As a result, the Seventh Circuit did
not adhere to the BIA’s definition of PSG because Chevron deference does not apply where the BIA’s prior rulings are inconsistent.251
For similar reasons, the Third Circuit also rejected the BIA’s approach after concluding that it was not entitled to Chevron deference.252
As the discussion above highlights, the finding that Chevron applies or does not apply to the definition of PSG is critical. The determination that Chevron deference is due to the BIA’s definition of
PSG leads courts to follow the BIA’s approach by adopting immutable characteristics, social visibility, and particularity.253 On the other
hand, the determination not to give Chevron deference to the BIA
can lead a court, such as the Seventh Circuit here, to reject the social
visibility and particularity components of the BIA’s definition of
PSG.254 If Chevron deference applies, then Chevron serves as a justification for the approach of the deferential circuit courts that follow
the BIA,255 and as a criticism of the allegedly non-deferential dissent-

248. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales v.
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)) (discussing whether a family could be a PSG).
249. Id. (internal citations omitted).
250. Id. at 616 (internal citations omitted).
251. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(claiming that “[u]nlike Matter of C-A-, where social visibility was treated as a relevant factor, in S-E-G-, the BIA concluded that the proposed social group fails the social visibility test. This lack of clarity on whether social visibility is a factor or a requirement indicates a lack of consistency, so under Chevron, Circuit courts should
not afford the BIA deference in this inconsistent approach.”); supra notes 193-194
and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 242, 246 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text.
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ing circuits’ approach.256 If Chevron deference does not apply, then
lack of deference justifies the dissenting circuits’ approach,257 and
serves as a basis for criticizing the deferential circuit courts following
the BIA.258
Finally, the Ninth Circuit applies Chevron deference in a different
way. The Ninth Circuit gives Chevron deference to the BIA’s precedential decisions about very similar groups, and uses the BIA’s approach to defining PSG in these instances.259 Otherwise, the Ninth
Circuit applies its two-alternatives test.260 This use of Chevron deference depends on the purported PSG in the case at hand.261 For example, the Ninth Circuit rationalizes following BIA decisions about
groups resisting gangs by relying on the doctrine of Chevron deference.262 The Ninth Circuit’s application of Chevron differs from that
of the circuit courts that follow the BIA and the dissenting circuits,
which respectively give and refuse to give Chevron deference to the
BIA’s definition of PSG, regardless of the facts of the case.263 If the
Ninth Circuit’s fact-specific application of Chevron is appropriate,
then this serves as both a justification for the Ninth Circuit’s approach
and as a criticism of the other two approaches.264 If the fact-specific
application is improper, however, this serves as a criticism of the
Ninth Circuit’s approach.265

256. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). For a similar argument criticizing another circuit court’s lack of deference to the BIA under the Chevron doctrine, see
James H. Martin, Note, The Ninth Circuit’s Review of Administrative Questions of
Law in the Immigration Context: How the Court in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS Ignored Chevron and Failed to Bring Harmony to “Particular Social Group” Analysis,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 159, 172-82 (2001).
257. See supra notes 193-194, 206, 247-252 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 208.
260. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010).
261. See supra notes 207-209, 222-226 and accompanying text.
262. See Ramos Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (asserting that
Chevron deference should be granted to the BIA’s analysis of the purported PSG of
Guatemalan youths who refuse to join gangs); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855,
856 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837) (holding that Chevron deference is
due to the BIA’s interpretation of the alleged PSG of Salvadoran youths who refuse
to join gangs); see also supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
263. Compare supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text, with supra notes 236242 and accompanying text, and supra notes 247-252 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 263.
265. See supra note 263.
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Social Visibility: Strengths and Weaknesses

In addition to Chevron, an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the social visibility test sheds light on the overall justifications and criticisms of the three different approaches to defining PSG.
Some commentators praise the addition of social visibility to the
analysis of social group. For example, a commentator noted that adding social visibility to the analysis of PSG “appears to be on more solid ground,” and can find support both in Second Circuit precedent
and the UNHCR Guidelines.266 Commentators also praise the social
perception approach, which serves as the foundation for the social
visibility test,267 by highlighting the adaptability of the approach to
changing and developing social contexts.268 Other strengths of social
perception include “the fluidity of [the] approach [which] is a pragmatic recognition of the absence of a completely settled and authoritative set of external standards of reference,” and that “the scope of
judicial discretion is greater than under the ejusdem generis approach, thus enabling judges to take account of the political and cultural specificity of circumstances in the applicant’s country of
origin.”269
Other commentators, however, have voiced criticism of the social
visibility test.270 First, the social visibility test would change the results in some well-respected, older cases.271 The use of social visibility
might jeopardize important precedent and thus harm the ability of

266. See, e.g., Martin, Major Developments in Asylum Law over the Past Year,
supra note 151 (referencing the UNHCR Guidelines and Second Circuit precedent as
support for the assertion that the addition of social visibility to the analysis of social
group “appears to be on more solid ground”). For an argument that social visibility
does not really draw support from the UNHCR Guidelines, see supra notes 153-60
and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
268. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 299-300.
269. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 484.
270. See infra notes 271-284 and accompanying text. For an argument that social
visibility needs clarification, see Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, Note, The Invisible
Refugee: Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ “Social Visibility” Doctrine,
76 MO. L. REV. 575, 597 (2011) (“The continuing discrepancies of the social visibility
doctrine will only lead to a greater divide until the BIA clarifies the social visibility
doctrine or until the Supreme Court ultimately decides the doctrine’s fate.”).
271. See, e.g., Marouf, supra note 47, at 65 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951,
957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th
Cir. 2006); In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996)) (arguing
that Kasinga and other BIA decisions that preceded In re C-A- and the social visibility test would come out differently under the new BIA approach adopting social visibility as a criterion for social group).
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asylum applicants to obtain asylum on the ground of a PSG based on
opposition to FGM,272 a PSG of Cuban homosexuals,273 and a PSG
based on the past experience of working as Salvadoran policemen.274
While the BIA claimed that it had been using social visibility all
along,275 the facts in these cases suggest that these PSGs would have
failed under the social visibility test.276 Other commentators note that
the fate of many claims involving gender and sexual orientation might
be negatively impacted by the social visibility test.277
Second, the social visibility test is difficult to apply. One commentator explains that “the ‘social visibility’ test will be inherently difficult to apply.278 Because this approach seems mostly subjective and
sociological in nature, not based on legal norms and principles like
the ‘protected characteristic’ approach, it poses unique evidentiary
challenges and likely will result in inconsistent and incoherent deci272. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365 (holding that young Togolese women who
have not had FGM and who oppose the practice constitute a PSG); see also Deborah
E. Anker, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: Refugee Law, Gender, and the
Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 146 (2002) (citing Kasinga, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 357) (discussing Kasinga and then concluding that “because of the cultural
relativist conundrum, the continued failure to take women’s rights seriously and the
complexity of the state responsibility question, gender asylum law is one of the few
areas where the question of FGS [“female genital surgery”] as a human rights violation is confronted”).
273. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding
that homosexuals known to the Cuban government constitute a PSG).
274. Cf. In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988) (recognizing that
former Salvadoran policemen might constitute a PSG in subsequent cases).
275. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
276. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); Marouf, supra note
47, at 64-65 (noting that “[t]he BIA’s decision in Kasinga, for example, contains no
information indicating that young women who oppose female genital cutting are publicly vocal about their opinion, or that anyone outside their families has reason to
know whether or not they have undergone the practice” and that “the UNHCR
points out that ‘the general population of Cuba would not recognize homosexuals
[regarding Toboso-Alfonso], nor would average Salvadorans necessarily recognize
former members of the national police [referring to Fuentes], nor would a typical Togolese tribal member inevitably be aware of women who opposed female genital mutilation but had not been subjected to the practice’ [referring to Kasinga]”); Brief for
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting Claimants at 8,
Thomas, No. A75-597-0331-034/-035/-036 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007); see also Danielle
L.C. Beach, 09-12 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Dec. 2009).
277. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 23-25 (citations omitted) (discussing
the negative impact that social visibility will likely have on claims by women who oppose and suffer domestic violence because domestic violence often occurs in private;
noting the negative impact that social visibility is likely to have on claims based on
sexual orientation because social stigma often leads asylum applicants to hide their
sexual orientation in their country of origin).
278. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 71-78.
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sions.”279 The way the BIA explains the social visibility test leaves
many questions unanswered, such as whether the test focuses on actual visibility “in the literal sense or in the ‘external criterion’ sense”,
which would subject a group without a literally visible characteristic
to different treatment, “or even[ ]whether it understands the difference.”280 This lack of clarity on how to apply social visibility and what
the test means contributes to inconsistent results.281 Additionally, social visibility arguably leads to the strange outcome where a group
that tries to remain unnoticed to avoid persecution cannot obtain asylum based on PSG.282 As discussed earlier, the BIA’s interpretation
of social visibility substantially differs from the UNHCR’s Guidelines,
even though the BIA’s adoption of the social visibility test purported
to rely on these Guidelines.283 Finally, “[b]ecause social visibility is
often not a black or white issue, making it a requirement for a valid
social group will lead to inconsistent and unreliable results.”284

3.

The Ninth Circuit’s Innate Characteristics or Voluntary
Association Test

In addition to Chevron and social visibility, it is important to examine the Ninth Circuit’s two-alternatives test before evaluating the different approaches in Part III. The Ninth Circuit justifies its twoalternatives test, which requires either innate characteristics or voluntary association, by relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, which in turn
partially relies on Acosta.285 Additionally, the two-alternatives test
“embraces individuals who are actually persecuted—even if they fail
to qualify for asylum under the statute’s other enumerated categories,” and provides “a mechanism that meets the needs of those who
do not fit neatly into a particular racial or religious group.”286 Finally,

279. Id. at 71. The criticisms of the BIA’s C-A- decision also apply as a justification of the Seventh Circuit’s approach. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying
text.
280. Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
281. See Bresnahan, supra notes 48, at 670-71.
282. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
283. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. CastilloArias, 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006); Marouf, supra note 47, at 49 (citing In re A-ME-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)).
284. Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 25 (citations omitted).
285. See supra Part I.C.2.
286. Immigration Law—Asylum—Ninth Circuit Holds That Persecuted Homo-

sexual Mexican Man with a Female Sexual Identity Qualifies for Asylum under Par-
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the two-alternatives test comports with congressional intent in adopting the Refugee Act of 1980, and with international obligations under
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.287
Courts and commentators have also criticized the two-alternatives
test. The voluntary association part of the two-alternatives test has
been “widely criticized,” and even “[t]he Ninth Circuit . . . seems to
have recognized the weakness” of the approach.288 Discussing the
voluntary association test, one critic claims that “[t]o the extent that
Sanchez-Trujillo presents an inconsistent and unclear framework—
emphasizing ‘voluntary associational relationship’ and then providing
the family as a ‘protyp[e]’—its test should probably be disregarded
and subsumed within the Board’s approach [following the immutable
characteristics test], which has been endorsed by commentators and
other courts.”289 In addition, the application of the two-alternatives
test in Perdomo can be criticized as defying the very meaning of “particular” by defining Guatemalan women, which make up half of a
country, as a PSG.290 Finally, commentators criticize the Ninth Circuit for “finding S-E-G- dispositive on the factual issue” of whether
the purported PSG is socially visible in several cases, including Ramos-Lopez and Ramos Barrios.291 These commentators explain that
“[s]ocial visibility determinations must be based on the facts and context of a particular country,”292 and that an older Ninth Circuit case
mandates that cases be determined based on the facts of the individual’s case, not on the cases of others.293 As this Part demonstrated,
ticular Social Group Standard—Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.
2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 2569, 2573 (2001).
287. See id.
288. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 277, 278 (citations omitted) (noting the “significant tension” between the voluntary association test and the immutable characteristics test, as demonstrated by the fact that the distinct group of homosexuals, for example, has immutable characteristics but is unlikely to satisfy the voluntary
association test); accord DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED
STATES 382 (3d ed. 1999) (citations omitted) (noting “the criticism leveled against
Sanchez-Trujillo”); see also Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 478 (asserting that
there is a consensus that voluntary association is not required for a cognizable PSG).
289. ANKER, supra note 288, at 382 (citations omitted).
290. See Doyle, supra note 119, at 548 (arguing that “defining a group of people
who comprise about half of society (females who live as women) as a ‘particular social group’ would seem to defy the addition of the modified ‘particular’” and that using gender as a PSG is “illogical”).
291. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 16-17 & n.99.
292. Id. at 16.
293. See id. at 17 (citations omitted) (finding that an individual is “entitled to a determination” based on the factual circumstance of his own case, “not [that] of others”
(quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969))).
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there is a conflict between the circuit courts that follow the BIA, the
dissenting circuits, and the Ninth Circuit about the meaning of PSG.
This conflict leads to disparate outcomes in asylum cases depending
on where the asylum proceedings take place.
III. RESOLUTION: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’ S APPROACH
After presenting the conflict regarding the definition of PSG
among the circuit courts in Part II, Part III proposes the adoption of
the Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach as a resolution to the conflict. This Part begins by proposing that uniformity and consistency in
the definition of PSG is a desirable goal, and that the Supreme Court
should resolve the conflict by adopting a uniform definition of PSG.
The dissenting circuits’ approach to defining PSG should be adopted
for the following reasons: proper application of Chevron deference;
relative ease of application; basis in coherent statutory analysis; consistency with international obligations; and rejection of the social visibility test and particularity requirement.
A. Uniformity and Consistency of Law, and the Supreme Court
An important argument in the debate about PSG is that the law
should be uniform and consistent.294 Refugee Roulette, an article
about the disparities in asylum outcomes, opened with the following
statement about judicial consistency in the United States:
We Americans love the idea of “equal justice under law,” the words
inscribed above the main entrance to the Supreme Court building.
We want like cases to come out alike. We publish tens of thousands
of judicial decisions and have enshrined the concept of stare decisis
in order to reduce the likelihood that Jane’s case, adjudicated in December 2006, will come out very differently from Joe’s very similar
case adjudicated in January 2007. . . . Americans don’t love consistent decision making merely because we think that fairness to the
parties requires that similar cases should have similar outcomes. We
also like the predictability that stare decisis offers.295

Uniformity in the law is desirable because it prevents arbitrary outcomes.296 In the context of PSG, “the complexity of U.S. social group
jurisprudence” begs for “additional clarity.”297 Judge Posner made
the following comment about the inconsistency of asylum law:
294.
295.
296.
297.

See Voss, supra note 40, at 252-53.
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 40, at 299.

See Voss, supra note 40, at 252-53.
Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 28.
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[G]iven the uncertainties in the law, the difficulties in the facts, [and]
the seemingly arbitrary variance among the immigration judges, the
court of appeals judges are also going to be falling back on . . . personal reactions, intuitions, values, and so on . . . . This is supposed to
be a uniform body of federal law. 298

The goal of uniformity in the law is particularly important in this
context because the absence of a clear, uniform definition of PSG has
led to many failed asylum applications in the United States.299
To help create uniformity in asylum law, the Supreme Court should
resolve the conflict about the definition of PSG. In light of the fact
that the Court has never expressly decided the meaning of PSG,300 a
recent Petition for Writ of Certiorari asked the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split over the definition of PSG.301 Although the Supreme Court did not explain why the Petition was denied, the arguments of the government might shed light on the denial. The
unpublished, brief case of Contreras-Martinez discusses a consistently
unsuccessful type of PSG—youths who refuse to join gangs.302 According to the government, this case was not a good vehicle for resolving the circuit split on how to define PSG because there is substantial agreement that refusal to join gangs should not constitute a
PSG.303 If the Court accepted the government’s narrow framing of
the issue as whether youths who refuse to join gangs constitute a
PSG,304 then the case would have been easy to dismiss.305 The denial
298. RAMI-NOGALES, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, supra note 40, at 79.
299. See Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims, supra note 40, at 120; Heyman,
Challenge of Domestic Violence, supra note 121, at 771 (arguing specifically for a
clearer definition of PSG and that “[u]nless consensus is reached on this issue [of the
definition of PSG], asylum cannot address claims effectively based on social group
membership”).
300. See Radtke, supra note 50, at 37.
301. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10, Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346
F. App’x 956 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-830), 2010 WL 128010; Radtke, supra note 50, at
37.
302. See Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3274
(2010); Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 50, at 8 (asserting that
“no court of appeals has held that people who refuse to join a gang because they object to the gang’s violent activities constitute a ‘particular social group’ under the
INA”).
303. See Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956; Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 50, at 8.
304. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 50, at 9; cf. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 9-10. But see Brief for the Respondent in
Opposition, supra note 50, at 10 (arguing that even assuming that there is a split on
the “permissible methodology for evaluating ‘particular social group’ claims,” the
split is “lopsided and less well developed than petitioner suggests”).
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of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari indicates that the case was not a
good vehicle for resolving the conflict.306 The Supreme Court, therefore, should resolve the circuit split when a better case comes along.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the INA to clarify the definition of PSG.307 In the 112th Congress, bills in both the House and the
Senate propose to amend the definition of PSG.308 House Bill 2185,
introduced by Democratic Representative Lofgren, and Senate Bill
1202, introduced by Democratic Senator Leahy, both include the
same definition of PSG.309 Both bills, entitled the Refugee Protection
Act of 2011, suggest the following amendment to the INA:
For purposes of determinations under this Act, any group whose
members share a characteristic that is either immutable or fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person’s human
rights such that the person should not be required to change it, shall
be deemed a particular social group, without any additional requirement.310

The bills are currently in Committee in both the House and Senate.311 Given the “daunting” challenge of passing immigration legisla-

305. See Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956; Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 50, at 8, (asserting that “no court of appeals has held that people
who refuse to join a gang because they object to the gang’s violent activities constitute a ‘particular social group’ under the INA”).
306. See supra notes 301-305 and accompanying text.
307. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 28 (claiming that “clarity could be
achieved . . . by amending the Refugee Act of 1980 to include a definition for social
group”).
308. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Congress, § 5(a)(D)
(2011); Refugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011).
309. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Congress, § 5(a)(D)
(2011). The same day the Refugee Protection Act was introduced in the House, the
Bill was introduced in the Senate, proposing the same language to define PSG. Refugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011). This language
came from Senator Leahy’s Bill introduced the year before in the 111th Congress.
See S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2010).
310. See H.R. 2185, 112th Congress, § 5(a)(D) (2011); S. 1202, 112th Cong. §
5(a)(D) (2011).
311. This House of Representatives Bill has eight co-sponsors. See H.R. 2185,
112th Congress, § 5(a)(D) (2011); 157 Cong. Rec. H5150-02 (2011). In August 2011,
the House Bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement. See Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 2185,
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2185: (last visited Sept. 12,
2011). Currently, the Senate Bill has three co-sponsors, and is in the Committee on
the Judiciary. See Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) S. 2012,
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01202: (last visited Sept.
12, 2011).
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tion in Congress,312 the Supreme Court’s resolution of the meaning of
PSG would be more efficient and effective.
B.

Adopting the Third and Seventh Circuits’ Approach

The Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach to defining PSG (the
immutable characteristics test) should be adopted to resolve the circuit split. The dissenting circuits’ approach properly applies Chevron,
is easiest to apply, has a basis in coherent statutory analysis, comports
with international obligations, and rejects the problematic social visibility test and particularity requirement. If given the opportunity to
rule on the definition of PSG, the Supreme Court should adopt the
approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits.313 In addition, the Fifth
Circuit,314 which has not yet taken a definitive position on the issue of
PSG, should adopt the approach of the dissenting circuits.
Significantly, the dissenting circuits properly apply Chevron in the
context of the BIA’s definition of PSG. Judge Posner’s well-founded
conclusion that the BIA’s prior rulings on PSG were inconsistent, especially with regard to the social visibility test, led to the decision not
to afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s approach.315 Based on this
determination, the dissenting circuits properly rejected the social visibility test and particularity requirements.316 In contrast, the circuit
courts that follow the BIA improperly applied Chevron deference to
the BIA’s social visibility test and particularity requirement because
they did not recognize that the BIA’s prior rulings on PSG were inconsistent.317 The BIA’s prior inconsistent decisions also undermine
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which gives Chevron deference to precedential BIA cases about similar groups.318

312. See WASEM, supra note 49, at 1 (noting that while “selected immigration issues are likely to be a major concern for the 112th Congress, . . . legislative action on
such contentious issues appears daunting”).
313. See supra Part II.B.
314. See, e.g., Bayavarpu v. Holder, 390 F. App’x 353, 353 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing the BIA’s social visibility and particularity requirements favorably, but basing its
holding only on the criterion that the PSG not be defined exclusively by persecution);
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting PSG
without explaining the rationale for this holding).
315. See supra notes 193-194, 247-251 and accompanying text. Cf. supra notes 7688 (providing an overview of the Chevron doctrine).
316. See supra notes 193-194, 206, 247-252, 257-258 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 236-242 and
accompanying text.
318. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.

STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN

292

3/9/2012 9:06 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

The dissenting circuits’ approach is also theoretically coherent.319
The Third and Seventh Circuits reject the approach of C-A- and
therefore avoid the questionable rationale of that decision.320 In rejecting social visibility and particularity, the dissenting circuits returned to the immutable characteristics test, which had generally been
the law for twenty years.321 The protected characteristics theory,
which is built on Acosta’s foundations, is respected and rests upon
strong theoretical underpinnings.322 Even assuming that the social
perception theory is a more coherent theory than the protected characteristics theory, the BIA misapplied the social perception theory in
C-A.323 Therefore, even if the momentum of the social perception
theory worldwide is acknowledged,324 the social visibility test significantly diverges from the theoretical framework of social perception.325 Consequently, whatever merits the social perception theory
may have, it cannot fully justify the social visibility test.326
The dissenting circuits’ approach is also theoretically coherent because these circuits reject particularity.327 According to the BIA,
“[t]he essence of the ‘particularity’ requirement . . . is whether the
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question,

319. See infra notes 320-331 and accompanying text.
320. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re C-A-, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d
1190 (11th Cir. 2006); Marouf, supra note 47, at 50 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
951) (arguing that adjudicators “should not give deference to the BIA’s decisions in
C-A- and . . . [another BIA decision] because they do not provide a permissible interpretation of the Convention and represent a sudden, unexplained change in the
way the BIA defines ‘membership of a particular social group’”); supra notes 191,
195, 200, 271-276 and accompanying text.
321. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 23
(expressing the hope that other circuit courts follow the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of
social visibility and particularity and return to the original immutable characteristics
test from Acosta).
322. See supra notes 99, 118–119, 155 and accompanying text (observing that the
protected characteristics approach, which is incorporated in the UNHCR Guidelines,
is endorsed by many jurists, scholars, and common law jurisdictions).
323. See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text (explaining how the BIA’s
social visibility test differs from the UNHCR’s social perception approach).
324. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 482-83 (describing how the social
perception approach has been adopted by the Australian courts, has influenced U.S.
national guidelines, and is sometimes relied upon by other jurisdictions).
325. See supra notes 100, 153–162.
326. See supra notes 100, 153–162.
327. See supra notes 199, 203–206 and accompanying text.
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as a discrete class of persons.”328 As this excerpt highlights, social visibility and particularity are not distinct tests.329 Emphasizing this
blending of the two tests, the Third Circuit concluded that particularity merely articulates the same concept underlying social visibility, and
ultimately rejected the particularity requirement.330 The inability to
meaningfully distinguish particularity from social visibility illustrates
that particularity is not a coherent legal test.331
In terms of statutory construction, the dissenting circuits’ approach
is the most advantageous. The Acosta test, which the dissenting circuits follow, does the following:
By basing the definition of “membership of a particular social
group” on application of the ejusdem generis principle, we respect
both the specific situation known to the drafters—concern for the
plight of persons whose social origins put them at comparable risk to
those in the other enumerated categories—and the more general
commitment to grounding refugee claims in civil or political status. . . . Most important, the standard is sufficiently open-ended to
allow for evolution in much the same way as has occurred with the
four other grounds, but not so vague as to admit persons without a
serious basis for claim to international protection.332

As a result, the immutable characteristics test comports with the intentions and the balance struck by the 1951 Convention.333 In addition, the immutable characteristics approach avoids the PSG as a
“safety net” position,334 which makes the persecution requirement of
asylum claims redundant.335 Acosta’s “middle ground position,” followed by the dissenting circuits, also avoids making the other categories redundant.336

328. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008).
329. See id.
330. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
332. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 161 (citations omitted).
333. See id.; Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 285.
334. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 157-60 (citing Arthur C.
Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39 (1983)).
335. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 156-60; Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 285.
336. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 160 (citations omitted);
Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 285.
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U.S. asylum law should comport with international obligations by
providing humanitarian protection for refugees,337 and the dissenting
circuits’ approach adheres to these international obligations. The following highlights the relationship between PSG and the 1951 Convention:
The analysis is guided by the underlying premise that a sensible interpretation of the term [refugee] must be responsive to victims of
persecution without so expanding the scope of the 1951 Convention
as to impose upon States obligations to which they did not consent.
In striking that delicate balance, it must be kept in mind that international refugee law bears a close relationship to international human rights law—that refugees are persons whose human rights have
been violated and who merit international protection.338

The United States has clearly indicated its intention to abide by international refugee law obligations,339 and therefore should adopt the
approach that best adheres to these obligations. A definition of PSG,
which discards social visibility and particularity, is better aligned with
the United States’ international obligations based on the case law that
the immutable characteristics test has generated in the past.340 By
continuing the trajectory of cases that have developed claims based
on gender and sexual orientation—claims which traditionally have
had difficulty under asylum law—the United States would better
comply with the obligations of international refugee law.341 The
adoption of the dissenting circuits’ test would safeguard the development of these valid and important asylum claims, and help ensure that
U.S. asylum law continues to abide by international obligations.342
The dissenting circuits’ approach is preferable to the approaches of
both the Ninth Circuit and the circuits that follow the BIA. Critiquing the other two approaches to defining PSG highlights the strengths
of the dissenting circuits’ approach. The Ninth Circuit’s approach is
not ideal for several reasons. First, both courts and commentators
337. See supra note 33; infra notes 338-339 and accompanying text; see also supra
Part I.B.
338. Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 265.
339. See supra Part I.B. and accompanying text.
340. See supra Part I.B.; supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
341. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 309 (citations omitted); supra notes 271-277
and accompanying text (claiming that the social visibility test threatens the future of
cases based on gender and sexual orientation, which developed under the immutable
characteristics test); see also supra Part I.B.
342. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 309 (quoting R v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t, Ex parte Shah, [1997] Imm. AR 145, 153 (A.C.)); supra notes 271-277
and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B.

STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN

3/9/2012 9:06 PM

2011] DO I NEED TO PIN A TARGET TO MY BACK?

295

criticize the voluntary association part of the Ninth Circuit’s twoalternatives test as inconsistent and problematic.343 Second, the Ninth
Circuit impermissibly uses the BIA’s S-E-G- decision as dispositive
on the factual issue of social visibility in its own cases involving youths
that refused to join gangs.344 This use was improper because determinations about an applicant’s PSG should be based on the facts of the
specific case, not on the outcome of an unrelated case.345 Finally, the
overall complexity of the Ninth Circuit’s approach makes it less attractive than the dissenting circuits’ simpler approach.346 In an area of
law already plagued by inconsistency,347 the Ninth Circuit’s splintered
approach, which may, depending on the facts, apply the voluntary association or the innate characteristics test (and may give the BIA either Chevron deference or Skidmore deference), is not the best route
to a clear, uniform body of asylum law.348
Criticism of the social visibility test, utilized by the circuits that follow the BIA, also highlights the reasons the dissenting circuits’ approach is preferable. The social visibility test leads to a strange result:
a group that tries to remain invisible to avoid persecution cannot obtain asylum based on PSG.349 Another criticism of this approach is
that well-respected cases that crucially developed asylum law based
on gender and sexual orientation would have had different outcomes
under social visibility, even though the BIA claims that it was using
the social visibility test all along.350 In addition, the social visibility
test is more difficult to apply than the immutable characteristics
test.351 The immutable characteristics test’s twenty years of precedent
makes it easier to apply than the social visibility test, which has only
been used for a few years.352 Additionally, the BIA’s opaque expla-

343. See supra notes 288-290 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 291-293 and accompanying text.
345. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 17 (citations omitted) (finding that an
individual is “entitled to a determination” based on the factual circumstance of his
own case, “not [that] of others” (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir.
1969))).
346. Compare supra Part II.C, with supra Part II.B.
347. See supra notes 297-299 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part II.C.
349. See supra notes 196-197, 282 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text.
352. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re C-A-, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d
1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
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nation and application of social visibility has not only contributed to
inconsistent results in the past,353 but will likely lead to future inconsistency and arbitrariness.354
After reviewing the criticisms of the circuits that follow the BIA
and the Ninth Circuit, certain concerns about the dissenting circuits’
approach should be considered. The main concerns about the Seventh Circuit’s approach are its lack of Chevron deference, which has
been addressed above,355 and worries about opening the floodgates.356
Concerns about the dissenting circuits’ definition of PSG opening the
floodgates of refugees are not well-founded.357 The floodgates argument has been raised at numerous points in American history and has
proved to be an unsubstantiated argument.358 For example, when
Kasinga held that a group that opposed FGM was a PSG, the concerns about a floodgates problem did not materialize.359 When Canada greatly expanded its grounds for asylum, the country did not experience a “flood” of new asylum seekers.360 Specifically, the addition
of gender as an enumerated ground for asylum in Canada only increased asylum applications by two percent.361 Finally, concerns
about floodgates should be alleviated by the fact that applicants still
need to establish the other elements of an asylum claim.362 In sum,
the Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach has many advantages over
the approaches of the other circuit courts.363

353. See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009); Bresnahan,
supra note 48, at 670-71.
354. See supra notes 279, 284 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 315–316 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 381.
359. See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 381-82; Siddiqui, supra note 37, at
528.
360. See Fletcher, supra note 37, at 129; Siddiqui, supra note 37, at 527-28.
361. See supra note 360.
362. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 380-81 (discussing how the
BIA’s recognition of a social group based on FGM in Kasinga created similar floodgate fears which never materialized and explaining how asylees have other obstacles
to surpass after establishing membership in a social group); Fletcher, supra note 37,
at 129 (explaining the favorable experience of Canada); Siddiqui, supra note 37, at
527-28 (explaining that the addition of gender as a basis for asylum had a negligible
effect on asylum applications and describing the other elements that asylees need to
prove).
363. See supra Part III.B.
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CONCLUSION
The resolution of the conflict between the circuit courts about the
definition of PSG is an important goal that would help achieve consistency and uniformity in the law.364 The Supreme Court should
adopt the approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits because of the
approach’s proper application of Chevron, relatively easy application,
coherent statutory interpretation, rejection of social visibility and particularity, and consistency with the United States’ international obligations.365
Elizabeth, the brutally mistreated Cameroonian widow, was granted asylum in the United States more than eight years after her initial
asylum application.366 Given that the IJ and BIA erred in their rulings on Elizabeth’s PSG,367 the lack of clarity about the definition of
PSG probably contributed to the duration of these proceedings.
Hopefully, when this conflict is resolved, asylum applicants like Elizabeth, will be able to find refuge in the United States through a timely, consistent, and fair asylum process.

364.
365.
366.
367.

See supra notes 294-299 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 11, 13, 14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13, 17, 18 and accompanying text.

